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I. Introduction 
The 1997-1998 Supreme Court term had more than its share of sig-
nificant employment-related cases, and assessed as a whole, it signals 
some important trends indicative of future directions the Court may 
take in the field of labor and employment law. Out of fifteen decisions 
in cases raising at least one workplace law claim, 1 at least five merit 
*A shorter version of this article was presented by the author as a portion of her 
report as secretary of the Section of Labor and Employment Law of the American Bar 
Association at the ABA Annual Meeting held in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 3, 
1998. 
**Marley S. Weiss is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of 
Law. She served as Secretary of the Section of Labor and Employment Law of the ABA 
in 1997-1998. 
1. The computation of fifteen errs on the side of generosity in characterizing cases 
as falling with the labor and employment law field. One is a per curiam decision in a 
suit alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which resolved a constitutional issue of generally applicability 
regarding the right to trial by jury and damage remedies, Hetzel v. Prince William County, 
118 S. Ct. 1210 (1998). In two other cases with signed opinions, the Court resolved issues 
of broad applicability, which happened to have arisen in a labor and employment law 
context, but could just as easily have arisen in other settings: Wisconsin Dep't of Correc-
tions v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 204 7 (1998) (federal removal jurisdiction when state asserts 
sovereign immunity in case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unconstitutional 
termination of employment); Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998) (rejecting 
"exculpatory no" defense in case arising out of criminal violation of Section 302 of the 
LMRA). The other twelve cases include: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 
(1998) (Title Vll sexual harassment); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) 
(Title Vll sexual harassment); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998) (consti-
tutional challenge to application of Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act); Geissal 
v. Moore Med. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998) (COBRA benefits coverage); Air Line Pilots 
Ass'n v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998) (ability ofRLA union to require non-members to 
exhaust arbitral procedures as precondition to litigation to review union's determination 
of amount assessable as fair share agency shop fees); Textron Lycoming Reciprocating 
Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Auto Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998) (federal jurisdic-
tion under § 301 of the LMRA for union claim of employer fraud in the inducement to 
enter into collective bargaining agreement); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (Title Vll sexual harassment); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct. 
966 (1998) §§ 1983 action for wrongful termination based on racially discriminatory 
motive as well as in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights); Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998) (ADEA/OWBPA); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. 
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extended consideration, along with a sixth, non-employment-based 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADAf case with many ramifications 
for workplace-related ADA actions. The three workplace sexual harass-
ment cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,4 Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth,5 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,6 along with a case 
alleging sexual harassment in public education under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972,7 Gebser v. Lago Independent School 
District, 8 have been addressed in detail in Part I of this article, published 
in the preceding issue of this journal.9 Part II, presented here, will 
address the remaining decisions of the term, focusing in particular on 
the three non-sexual harassment cases of substantial significance to 
the field oflabor and employment law: Allentown Mack Sales & Service, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 10 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 11 and Bragdon v. A bbott.12 
InA llentown Mack, the Court addressed the lawfulness under theN a-
tiona! Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of employer polling of its employees' 
union sentiments, resolving issues of considerable substantive impor-
tance, legally and practically, in a decision carrying complicated and dif-
ficult administrative law implications. In Eastern Enterprises, the Court 
held unconstitutional a provision of the Coal Industry Retiree Health 
Benefits Act of 1992, which compelled former coal operator employers to 
make payments to a fund to ensure the benefits of their former coal min-
ing employees. The statute itself is of interest to only a narrow segment 
of business and labor. However, the constitutional analysis of the four 
member plurality, finding the provision violative of the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, 
finding the statute's retroactivity violative of Due Process, hold analyti-
cal significance for a broad array of labor and social legislation, as well 
as other types of enactments. The ADA case, Bragdon v. Abbott, while 
strictly speaking not an employment case at all, construes a series of pro-
v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998) (NLRA); LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998) 
(propriety of discharge of federal civil servant for separate offense oflying to investigators 
in course ofinvestigation into underlying alleged on-the-job misconduct); Bay Area Laun-
dry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997) (ERISA/ 
MPPAA withdrawal liability statute of limitations). 
2. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12181-12189 (1998). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1998). 
4. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
5. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
6. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
7. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-1688 (1998). 
8. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
9. Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and Employment Law 
Term (Part 1): The Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14 THE LABoR LAw. 261, 267-315 (1998). 
10. 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
11. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). 
12. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
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visions of the ADA that are equally applicable under Title I, the employ-
ment portion of the statute. As the first major Supreme Court construc-
tion of the ADA, its precedential importance may in retrospect come to 
resemble that of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 13 under Title VII. 
This article will review the labor and employment law-related cases 
decided during the 1997-1998 term. Next, it will briefly discuss the two 
labor and employment law cases settled on the steps of the Supreme 
Court, as well as several decided cases which arose under other laws, 
but resolved issues pertinent to labor and employment law. Thereafter, 
it will more closely scrutinize Allentown Mack, Eastern Enterprises, 
and Bragdon v. Abbott. The concluding portion of the article will present 
some general observations about the term as a whole, discerning some 
trends among the decisions, and in the opinions of particular justices. 
II. Overview of the Labor and Employment Law Decisions of 
this Term 
A. The Employment Discrimination Cases 
Six cases before the Court had been pled in the trial court, in whole 
or in part, as employment discrimination cases. However, only in four 
did the Court on certiorari address substantive law issues on the merits. 
In two others, the Court focused on issues more peripheral to the sub-
stantive claims. Three of the employment discrimination law decisions 
have been discussed in detail elsewhere: Oncale, 14 Faragher, 15 and El-
lerth/6 each of which involved claims that arose under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, addressing issues pertaining to sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.17 
The Court decided only one Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA)18 case, but one with considerable practical significance. Oubre 
v. Entergy Operations, Inc. 19 interpreted the waiver provisions created 
by the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) amendments 
of 1990 to the ADEA 20 as precluding application of common law doc-
trines of ratification or equitable estoppel to require an ADEA plaintiff 
to tender back monies received from the employer in conjunction with 
an invalid waiver of ADEA claims. An ADEA plaintiff now cannot be 
required to tender back monies received in conjunction with a release 
13. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
14. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
15. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
16. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.2257 (1998). 
17. Discussion of the sexual harassment decisions may be found in Part I of this 
review of the Supreme Court term, Weiss, supra note 9, at 267-315. 
18. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (1998). 
19. 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998). 
20. 29 u.s.c. § 626(0. 
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as a condition of suit under the ADEA, if the waiver failed to strictly 
comply with the criteria set forth in the OWBP A. 21 
The Court also issued a per curiam decision in another employment 
discrimination case, Hetzel v. Prince William County,22 in which the 
plaintiff had won a jury verdict under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 
The district court reduced the jury award of damages from $750,000 to 
$500,000.24 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the imposition of 
liability, but held the amount of the award grossly excessive in light 
of the evidence, set it aside, and remanded for recalculation of the emo-
tional distress component of damages.25 The district court on remand 
awarded plaintiff $50,000. The plaintiff declined this award in her mo-
tion for a new trial, treating the ruling as the equivalent of a remittitur 
and asserting a Seventh Amendment right to a new trial. 26 
The district court granted the new trial on the issue of damages. 27 
However, the defendant then sought and obtained a writ of mandamus 
in the Court of Appeals, ordering further recalculation of the damage 
award in light of two highly restrictive Fourth Circuit precedents on 
emotional distress damages.28 The Fourth Circuit also ordered the dis-
trict court, after recomputation of damages, to enter judgment without 
the option ofretrial.29 On certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted plain-
tiff's contention that this entry of judgment without the alternative of 
a new trial violated plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to trial by 
jury, following precedents regarding remittitur.30 
Bogan v. Scott-Harris31 arose out of a municipal employee's civil 
rights action claiming discrimination based on race, as well as retalia-
tion for exercise of First Amendment rights. 32 The Court recognized 
absolute legislative immunity as a defense available to municipal as 
well as state and local governmental officials when acting in their legis-
lative capacity.33 The Court then broadly construed "legislative capac-
ity," and consequently legislative immunity, to apply to the develop-
21. 118 S. Ct. at 84142. The Court left open to employers, however, the possibility 
of asserting (counter )claims for restitution, recoupment, or setoff against employees. I d. 
at 842. The Oubre Court also acknowledged the potential complications entailed in a 
release that could be effective as to non-ADEA claims, but nugatory as to the ADEA 
claims arising from the same termination decision. I d. 
22. 118 S. Ct. 1210 (1998). 
23. Id. 
24. ld. 
25. Id. 
26. ld. 
27. Id. at 1210-11. 
28. ld. at 1211 & n.l. 
29. I d. at 1211. Pursuant to the writ of mandamus, the district court thereupon 
recomputed damages and entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $15,000. I d. 
at 1211 n.l. 
30. ld. at 1211-12. 
31. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998). 
32. ld. at 969. 
33. Id. at 969, 970-72. 
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ment and adoption of a provision included within budget legislation 
that was allegedly targeted to eliminate plaintiff's position because of 
the employee's race or protected speech.34 
B. Benefits Cases Under the MPPAA and COBRA 
Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar 
Corp of California, Inc. 35 was the one Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 197 4 (ERISA) case of the term. The decision addressed 
the problem of accrual and running of the statute of limitations in plan 
lawsuits to enforce employer liability for unpaid withdrawal contribu-
tions under the Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
(MPP AA). Reading the statute in a literal fashion, the Court held that 
the cause of action does not accrue, hence the six year statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until the plan trustees calculate the employ-
er's withdrawal liability, establish the installment payment schedule 
pertaining thereto, send the employer notice of the schedule and a de-
mand for payment, and the employer fails to tender a payment by the 
date when it is due.36 Drawing on common law installment contract 
doctrine, the Court further held that a new claim arises for each missed 
payment. The pension plan in the case before the Court, therefore, was 
time-barred only from recovering the frrst installment payment, due 
slightly more than six years before the plan had filed suit, but could 
recover all remaining overdue payments.37 
In another employee benefits-related case, Geissal v. Moore Med. 
Corp.,38 a unanimous Court again read a statutory provision in a 
straightforward and literal manner.39 The Court held that only depen-
dent or other health care coverage obtained by the former employee 
after he or she attains eligibility pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) permits the employer to 
avoid its COBRA obligation to provide continuing benefit coverage.40 
Preexisting spousal or other non-employment based coverage does not 
34. I d. at 972-73. "Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, 
rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it." See also infra note 348 
and accompanying text (discussing Bogan as an instance of the Court's greater sensitivity 
this term to the concerns of public as opposed to private employer defendants). 
35. 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997). 
36. Id. at 549. 
37. /d. at 551, 552-53. 
38. 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998). 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(DXi), which provides that an employer may cease providing 
COBRA continuation coverage as of "the date on which the qualified beneficiary first 
becomes after the date of election ... covered under any other group health plan (as an 
employee or otherwise) .... "(emphasis added). 
40. COBRA amended ERISA to require employers to afford plan beneficiaries under 
the employer's group health insurance plan an opportunity to elect continuing coverage 
upon termination of employment or certain other "qualifying events" that would other-
wise cause cessation of their health care coverage. The employee or other beneficiary 
must remit premiums to the employer, but continues coverage on the same terms as 
provided during the employment relationship. 29 U.S.C. § 1163. 
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affect the employee's eligibility for COBRA benefits. The effect of Geis-
sal is to leave it up to the employee the make his or her own comparative 
assessment of benefits under alternatively available plans, and ascer-
tain whether it is worth the cost of remitting to the former employer 
the premium payments necessary to maintain the COBRA benefits. A 
third benefits case, Eastern Enterprises,41 will receive separate treat-
ment as one of the more significant cases of this Term.42 
C. Collective Labor Relations 
Three cases can be classified as collective labor relations matters: 
Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller,43 a union dues case, Textron Lycom-
ing Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Automobile Work-
ers,44 a Section 301 suit claiming fraudulent misrepresentation by the 
employer in bargaining the labor contract, and Allentown Mack,45 the 
employer polling case under the NLRA. Discussion of Allentown Mack 
will be deferred to a later portion of this work, where the decision will 
receive the in-depth consideration it merits.46 
1. Union Dues 
Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller41 held that a Railway Labor 
Act (RLA) union cannot compel non-members to exhaust a union-devised 
arbitral remedy as a_precondition to judicial litigation challenging the 
union's determination of the percentage of its expenditures attributable 
to collective bargaining and contract enforcement-related matters. This 
determination, in turn, establishes the amount of an agency shop "fair 
share" service fee in lieu of dues, lawfully chargeable to the non-member 
fee payers. Since the non-members are parties to no agreement with the 
union, much less one binding them to arbitrate the fee determination 
disputes, the Court reasoned, the non-members cannot be compelled to 
proceed in a purely voluntary, privately-established, arbitral forum. 
This remains the case, the Court concluded, even though, at least under 
the analogous line of public sector First Amendment-based caselaw,48 
the Court has held unions to be required to provide objecting non-
members with a dispute resolution forum presided over by an impartial 
decisionmaker. 49 
41. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). 
42. See infra Part V. 
43. 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998). 
44. 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998). 
45. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
46. See infra Part IV. 
4 7. 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998). 
48. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986). 
49. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1766-69. 
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2. Fraud in the Inducement under Section 301 
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United 
Automobile Workers50 involved the UAW's unsuccessful effort to obtain 
federal jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA) to litigate a tort damage claim for fraud in the induce-
ment to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. During bar-
gaining for a new labor contract, Textron allegedly had been repeatedly 
asked by the union to provide information about the employer's plans 
to subcontract work performed by union-represented employees, and 
the employer had disclosed no such plans. Only a few months after 
signing the new agreement, however, Textron announced its intention 
to subcontract a sufficient volume of work to eliminate the jobs of about 
half of the members of the bargaining unit at the facility.51 
Despite the long history of liberal construction of Section 301 to 
establish a common law of the labor contract, 52 the Court read the stat-
ute in accordance with its literal terms. "Suits for violation of con-
tracts," the Court reasoned, cannot cover a claim alleging not that the 
contract has been breached, but that it is invalid. 53 This portion of the 
opinion commanded the support of all nine justices. 54 
The majority left open the possibility that the union could strike 
in violation of the contractual no-strike clause, and in a suit by the 
50. 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998). 
51. Id. at 1628. 
52. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). "Section 
301 is not to be given a narrow reading." Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 
199 (1962). 
53. 118 S. Ct. at 1629. Several of the circuits, however, had previously reached the 
opposite statutory construction. See, e.g., International B'hd of Teamsters Local 952 v. 
American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1995) (claim by union of fraud 
in the inducement to enter into collective bargaining agreement is not preempted by 
§ 301 and is cognizable thereunder); Rozay's Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, Local 
208, 850 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989) (claim of 
fraud in the inducement to enter into collective bargaining agreement may be brought 
under§ 301); Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Wilson, 915 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992) (same). See also, e.g., ffiEW Local 481 v. 
Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1988) (overruling NDK Corp. v. Local1550, United 
Food and Commercial Workers, 709 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1983), a case holding fraud in the 
inducement not cognizable under § 301, in the course of holding that disputes over the 
validity of collective bargaining agreements may be litigated under § 301); Mack Trucks, 
Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 583, 587-90 (3d Cir. 1988) (§ 301 suit 
to hold collective bargaining agreement valid states a claim). 
54. Justice Stevens joined in the majority opinion, although he filed a separate 
concurring opinion, discussed immediately infra, which asserted NLRA preemption as 
an additional ground for reaching the construction of Section 301 adopted by the Court. 
I d. at 1632. Justice Breyer was not a signatory to the majority opinion, but commenced 
his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment with the statement, "I 
agree with pages 1 through 5 of the Court's opinion," and differed with the majority only 
as to its construction of the Declaratory Judgment Act. I d. 
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employer, interpose the invalidity of the contract.55 The union, however, 
was plainly more interested in attaining federal jurisdiction in a suit 
to recover tort damages for the employer's wrongfully inducing the 
union to enter into the agreement in the first place, at a time when 
the union's bargaining leverage presumably could have been deployed 
to greater effect. 
The Court rejected an alternative argument for federal jurisdic-
tion, based on the union's reading of the Declaratory Judgment Act56 
together with Section 301. In light of the posture of the case, the Court 
viewed the matter as failing to present a live case or controversy to 
support a declaration of voidability of the agreement on grounds of 
fraud. 57 As the Court noted, the real interests of each party were 
adverse to those entailed in litigating the voidability of the labor 
contract. The employer vigorously disputed the underlying fraud alle-
gations but had "no interest in defending the binding nature of the 
contract," while the union had no real "interest in establishing the 
nonbinding nature of the contract."58 
As far as it appears, the company that had just eliminated the work 
of half its Williamsport employees would have been perfectly willing 
to be excused from a contract negotiated when the Union was in a 
stronger bargaining position, and the Union. had no intent or disposi-
tion to exercise a theoretical option to avoid a contract that was better 
than what it could negotiate anew. The fact that the fraud damages 
claim, if successful, would establish a voidability that (as far as appears) 
no one cared about, does not make the question of voidability a "case 
of actual controversy". . .. 59 
Eight justices declined, therefore, to resolve the question of whether 
there would be federal jurisdiction over a similar action had the union 
threatened a strike in protest against the subcontracting decision, 
thereby creating a potentially live case or controversy as to whether 
the union was bound by the no-strike provision of the agreement. 60 
Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer, concurring only in the judg-
ment on this point, would have reached the issue. He would have permit-
ted suit, seeking a declaration of invalidity of the contract, had a strike 
been imminent. His opinion is vague about whether and on what basis 
such an action could support a claim for a tort damage remedy. His 
concurrence does state the view, however, that had the union shown 
that a strike and consequent breach of contract suit at the behest of 
the employer was "imminent ... the Declaratory Judgment Act ... 
would have authorized the District Court to adjudicate this contro-
55. ld. 
56. 28 u.s.c. § 2201. 
57. Id. at 1631. 
58. ld. 
59. Id. 
60. ld. 
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versy."61 Justice Breyer may well contemplate that coupling a claim 
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act with Section 301 jurisdiction 
would support a tort damage remedy in addition to a declaration that 
the collective bargaining agreement is invalid.62 The majority opinion, 
on the other hand, in extended dicta, expresses considerable skepticism 
about the assumptions required to reach this result.63 
At least so long as a union fails to demonstrate any intention immi-
nently to strike over the subcontracting, all nine justices hold no federal 
cause of action will lie under Section 301 and the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.64 The Court declined to address the union's conclusory assertion 
in a footnote of its brief, not presented in the petition for certiorari, that 
an alternative source of federal jurisdiction might be found under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 which provides for general federal questionjurisdiction.65 
The underlying question, however, remains unaddressed in Textron: 
is an intentional tort damage action based on fraud in the inducement to 
enter into a collective bargaining agreement consistent with the federal 
labor relations scheme? Dismissal for lack of federal court jurisdiction 
pretermits the substantive construction of Section 301, the federal com-
mon law of the labor agreement, as well as federal labor policy arising 
from the LMRA, to either support or preclude the tort cause of action. 
It may be, however, that without ever reaching this policy issue on the 
merits, the holding in Textron on a formal, doctrinal level precludes a 
holding that the LMRA preempts the state tort claim. 
The Court's implicit construction of Section 301 is that it has no 
applicability to claims based on the negotiation rather than the imple-
mentation of the collective bargaining agreement. Assuming there is 
no federal jurisdiction over claims based on fraud in the bargaining 
process, it would follow that if filed in state court, such claims cannot 
be removed to federal court. Logic might also suggest that there is no 
basis to assert complete or other preemption under the LMRA as to 
such tort allegations, since the Textron Court's construction of Section 
61. Id. at 1632. 
62. Were a majority of the Court to adopt this position in a subsequent case, it might 
assure the union of the ability to litigate the claim for intentional tort damages for the 
alleged fraud. The implication of the Supreme Court decision in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Mullens, 455 U.S. 72 (1982), is that where necessary to determine the merits of a defense 
to a Section 301 action, the courts may construe the NLRA to establish the lawfulness 
thereunder of the contract provision whose enforcement is sought. Smith v. Evening 
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1952), holds that where a claim of violation of a provision 
of the collective bargaining agreement also constitutes a violation of the NLRA, federal 
courts retain Section 301 jurisdiction, and the NLRB's jurisdiction is not exclusive. See 
generally II THE DEVELOPING LABoR LAw 1208-11 (3d ed. 1992) (Patrick Hardin, ed.·in-chieO 
(hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]; id., 1997 Supp. at 601-13. 
63. Textron, 118 S. Ct. at 1630-31. 
64. ld. at 1631 (majority opinion); id. at 1632 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
65. Id. at 1629 n.l. Apart from the NLRA itself, however, it is difficult to imagine 
another source for federal question jurisdiction in such a case, and direct reliance on the 
NLRA would certainly highlight the NLRA preemption problem. 
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301 makes it clear that claims offraud in the inducement to enter into 
the agreement fall wholly outside the scope of the statute.66 
One must question whether the Court should resolve such funda-
mental issues offederallabor policy, however, through literal statutory 
construction, inconsistent with the more generous interpretative ap-
proach the Court's precedents have taken with the same statute, as 
well as without consideration on the merits of the competing policy 
considerations. It is also ironic that the Court's decisions may well have 
vitiated the line of lower court cases holding Section 301 to preempt 
intentional tort claims based on allegations such as fraud in the induce-
ment to enter into the collective bargaining agreement;67 the union no 
doubt consciously framed the Textron case so as to avoid that line of 
decisions, as well as those arising under the NLRA. 
The NLRA's Garmon68 preemption, it should be noted, may still 
apply to tort litigation of this type, although the defense would be adjudi-
cable only through the state courts. Indeed, Justice Stevens, concurring, 
found the Section 301 pleading to so clearly state a claim for employer 
breach of the duty to bargain in good faith that he relied on the Board's 
primary jurisdiction as a further ground for rejecting the construction 
66. Cf Voilas v. General Motors Corp., __ F.3d _, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3339, *18 n.1 (3d Cir. March 3, 1999) (noting that Textron's narrow construction of 
§ 301 jurisdiction "suggests a correspondingly narrow scope for preemption," because 
"jurisdiction under § 301 is the obverse of preemption."). One should note in addition 
that no construction of the agreement is necessary to determine whether the employer 
intentionally misrepresented or concealed facts material to its bargaining partner in 
negotiating the labor contract. These cases therefore fall outside the rationale of the line 
of LMRA preemption cases stemming from Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 4 71 U.S. 202 (1985). 
See Lingle v. Magic Chef, Norge Div'n, 486 U.S. 399 (1988); United Steelworkers v. 
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990). See also Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994) 
(RLA). 
67. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764, 768-71 (7th Cir. 
1991) (§ 301 preempted suit by 22 former employees claiming that employer had fraudu-
lently induced them to move from New Jersey to Indiana under collective bargaining 
agreement transfer option provision, by false assurances of stable employment); with, 
e.g., Voilas v. General Motors Corp., __ F.3d at __ , 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3339, 
at *19-29 (3d Cir. March 3, 1999) (following Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 
(1987), to hold that § 301 preemption does not apply to individual retired employee plain-
tiffs' claims that GM fraudulently induced them to accept early retirement package by 
falsely asserting plant would soon close); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 
217, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1995) (employee fraud claims based on employer promise that employ-
ees would retain jobs if they decertified union held not preempted under § 301); Wells 
v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 172-75 (6th Cir. 1989) (individual employees' 
claims that employer fraudulently induced them to accept voluntary termination plan 
by false assurances regarding future reemployment prospects held not preeempted under 
§ 301); International B'hd of Teamsters Local 952 v. American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 
F.3d 770, 774 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (union claims of fraudulent inducement to enter 
collective bargaining agreement not preempted by § 301); Rozay's Transfer v. Local 
Freight Drivers, Local 208, 850 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1030 (1989) (employer's claims of fraud in the inducement not preempted by § 301). 
68. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
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of Section 301 urged by the union.69 Given the turns and twists the 
Court has taken with preemption doctrine, however, speculation about 
labor preemption matters not specifically decided by the Court must 
be regarded as just that-speculation. 
D. Other Labor and Employment Law Decisions: No "Exculpatory 
No" Either in Federal Criminal Law or in Federal Employment 
In LaChance v. Erickson, 70 addressing the consolidated cases of sev-
eral terminated federal employees, the Court rejected the employees' 
contention that the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause precluded 
federal agencies from not only charging their employees with miscon-
duct on the job, but separately further charging them and eventually 
discharging them for making false statements in the course of the 
agency's investigation into the alleged original, underlying misconduct. 
In Brogan v. United States,71 a union representative had made false 
statements to a federal investigator in the course of an investigation 
into allegations that the union official had received payments from an 
69. ld. at 1631-32 (Stevens, J., concurring). But cf, e.g., Belknap, Inc., v. Hale, 
463 U.S. 491 (1983) (state has a "substantial interest in protecting its citizens from 
misrepresentations that have caused them grievous harm," holding replacement workers' 
state tort claim against employer for fraudulent misrepresentation of their "permanent" 
status not preempted by NLRA); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 436 
U.S. 180, 193-94 (1978) (Garmon "arguably protected" rationale "has its greatest force 
when applied to state laws regulating the relations between employees, their union, 
and their employer," rather than "laws of general applicability which are occasionally 
invoked in connection with a labor dispute," such as common law intentional torts 
doctrine). Among the many circuit court decisions, compare, e.g., Voilas, __ F .3d at 
__ , 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3339, at 29-36 (no NLRA preemption of retired employees' 
claims of fraudulent inducement to accept early retirement package by falsely asserting 
plans to imminently close the plant); Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d at 170-72 
(individual employees' claims that employer fraudulently induced them to accept volun-
tary termination plan held not preempted by NLRA); with, e.g., Parker v. Connors Steel 
Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1516-18 (11th Cir. 1988) (claim of fraudulent inducement of union 
to enter into concessionary agreement held preempted by NLRA), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1066 (1989); Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 960-62 (7th Cir. 1986) (claim based 
on fraudulent failure to disclose intent to close plant in the course of negotiations for a new 
collective bargaining agreement held preempted under Garmon preemption rationale); 
Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279, 1286-88 (6th Cir. 1986) (claims 
of fraud in the inducement to enter concessionary collective bargaining agreement based 
on employer promises to keep plant open held subject to NLRA Garmon preemption). 
Following precedent set in William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Jackson-
ville, 417 U.S. 12, 15-18 (1974) and Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 
(1962), some circuits had treated allegations ofNLRA Garmon preemption as no obstacle 
to § 301 jurisdiction over such claims. See, e.g., American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d at 
773-74; Rozay's Transfer, 850F.2d at 1326, ffiEW, Local481 v. Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d 
499, 503 (7th Cir. 1988); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 
585-86 (3d Cir. 1988). This line of reasoning will no longer shelter claims offraud in the 
inducement from NLRA preemption, however, in light of Textron, although it remains 
open to the courts to rely on Belknap and draw sufficient distinction between the nature 
of the potential NLRA claim and the nature of the state tort theory to contend that 
Garmon preemption is inapplicable. 
70. 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998). 
71. 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998). 
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employer in violation of Section 30272 of the LMRA. The union represen-
tative was convicted of making false statements, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1001, in addition to his conviction of the underlying criminal 
violation of Section 302.73 In a five to four decision authored by Justice 
Scalia, with Justice Kennedy providing the fifth vote, the Court rejected 
the "exculpatory no" exception to the federal criminal statute for mere 
denial of wrongdoing, 74 a doctrine developed and concurred in by several 
Circuit Courts.75 The Supreme Court held that targets may either re-
main silent or assert their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, but may not deliberately lie, even if not un<ier oath, 
without risking prosecution.76 Neither the statute, nor Fifth Amend-
ment due process, the majority concluded, was violated by such a statu-
tory construction. 77 The holding in Brogan may be seen as the criminal 
law analogue to LaChance v. Erickson.78 
III. The Penumbra around the Labor and Employment Law 
Decisions: Settled Cases and Non-Employment Cases 
A. The Term That Might Have Been-Settled Cases 
Fifteen out of ninety-one cases, or 16% of the Court's docket this 
year, grew out of cases in which labor and employment issues had been 
pled in the trial court. If one counts only the thirteen cases in which the 
Supreme Court actually decided labor and employment-related issues, 
twelve of the cases, or 13% qualify as labor and employment law deci-
sions. By historical standards, this year's percentage pales in compari-
son to the 20% or 25% of the Court's docket typically occupied by labor 
cases twenty or thirty years ago. On the other hand, compared to recent 
years, the proportion of labor and employment matters this year was 
rather large.79 Moreover, the high visibility and social as well as legal 
72. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1997). 
73. 118 S. Ct. at 808. 
74. I d. at 808-10. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas were 
also in the majority. Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment on the 
basis that "a false denial fits the unqualified language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001," but urged 
Congress to reconsider the provision in light of its potential for abuse by prosecutors "to 
manufacture crimes." Id. at 812. 
75. I d. at 808. See Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equila-Juarez, 851 
F.2d 122, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 717-19 (11th Cir. 
1986), United States v. Fiztgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-81 (lOth Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1975). 
76. I d. at 810. 
77. ld. at 808-10. 
78. 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998). 
79. A review of my predecessors' presentations at the annual meeting provides some 
appropriate comparison data. In 1990-1991, twenty-two out of 112 cases on the Supreme 
Court's docket, or about twenty per cent were labor and employment law cases. Stephen 
Mazurak, The Status of the Employment Relationship: The 1990-1991 Supreme Court 
Term, 7 THE LABoR LAW. 849, 853 (1992). In 1991-1992, eighteen cases raised labor and 
employment law questions. Roger A. Hartley, Foreword: The Supreme Court's 1991-1992 
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significance of the sexual harassment cases, the precedential impor-
tance of Allentown Mack, the constitutional implications of Eastern 
Enterprises, and the strong employment discrimination law implica-
tions of the ADA public accommodations case, Bragdon v. Abbott, make 
this a Supreme Court term to remember for labor and employment 
lawyers. 
Had the parties not settled two additional cases in which the Court 
had already granted certiorari, the proportionate significance of this 
term would have been greater still. The UAW and Caterpillar, in the 
course of settling the hundreds of unfair labor practices cases as well 
as other litigation still unresolved between them when they finally 
concluded a new collective bargaining agreement, also settled a case 
before the Supreme Court.8° Caterpillar had sought a declaratory judg-
ment that its long-standing collective bargaining agreement provision 
providing paid leave of absence for full-time union committeepersons 
and grievance chairpersons, in which the union officials were paid the 
equivalent of the regular wages and fringe benefits they would have 
earned had they remained on the job, violated the criminal prohibition 
of Section 302 of the LMRA. 81 Besides the potential implications of such 
a decision for criminal law enforcement, such a declaratory judgment 
could have allowed employers with similar contract provisions to claim 
they were void as against public policy, and hence unenforceable, in 
labor arbitration and Section 301 suits. In addition, employers could 
have resisted union efforts to negotiate or maintain such provisions 
during bargaining for new collective bargaining agreements by raising 
their illegality as a defense to any claim that the employer had refused 
Labor and Employment Law Term, 8 THE LABoR LAW. 739, 745 n.27 (1992). In 1992-1993, 
labor and employment law cases dropped both as an absolute number and as a percentage 
of the docket. Only ten out of 125 rulings and 108 full opinions dealt with matters in 
this field. Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court 1992-1993 Term: A Review of Labor and 
Employment Law Cases, 9 THE LABOR LAw. 603, 603 (1993). The 1993-1994 docket included 
eleven workplace-related disputes, see Joseph R. Grodin, 1993-1994 Supreme Court Labor 
and Employment Law Term, 10 THE LABoR LAw. 693, 693 (1994). In 1995-1996, twelve 
out of seventy-five cases decided by the Court involved workplace-related matters. Michael 
Gottesman, Labor, Employment, and Benefits Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1995-1996 
Term, 12 THE LABoR LAw. 325, 327 (1997). In 1996-1997, the Court's overall caseload 
bottomed out at seventy-four, see Keith N. Hylton, Labor and the Supreme Court: Review 
of the 1996-1997 Term, 13 THE LABoR LAw. 263,264 (1997), of which at least twelve are 
fairly categorized as labor and employment cases. I d. at 297 (counting a total of seven 
decisions arising under Title Vll, NLRA, and ERISA); id. at 272-95 (discussing eleven 
cases arising under various workplace-related laws, together with several public sector 
cases, only two of which involved an employee-employer dispute; the others involved 
immunity issues pertaining to the liability of public employers or public employees to 
third parties). 
80. Caterpillar v. International Union, United Auto Workers, 107 F.3d 1052 (3d 
Cir.1997)(en bane), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 31 (1997), cert. dismissed pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 46.1, 118 S. Ct. 1350 (1998). 
81. ld. at 1053. 
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to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(aX5) of the NLRA,82 
and by charging the union with violating Section 8(bX3) of the NLRA 
if it demanded inclusion of such an illegal provision in an agreement, 
or bargained for or reached impasse over its inclusion. 
Of far broader significance, however, would have been a Supreme 
Court decision in Piscataway Township Board o{Education v. Tax man. 83 
The settlement of the Piscataway case eliminated what would have been 
a seventh employment discrimination case from the Court's docket. 
Observers widely regarded that case as having the potential to produce 
a landmark judicial re-examination of United Steelworkers v. Weber84 
and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County.85 These 
precedents had interpreted Title VII as permitting moderate forms of 
race and sex-based affirmative action preferences so long as they were 
not intended to attain rather than maintain racial or gender balance, 
and did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests" of non-preferred em-
ployees. Dismissals based on settlement by the parties pursuant to Su-
preme Court Rule 46.1 are relatively unusual; the fact that there were 
two this term within the labor and employment law field, including 
one of such an exceptionally high profile, is extraordinary. Together 
with the fifteen decided cases, they may also suggest a renewed and 
heightened interest among the Justices in issues arising in the labor 
and employment field. 
B. Non-Labor Cases of Special Significance to Labor and 
Employment Law Specialists 
In addition to the cases litigating claims of violations of labor or 
employment laws or defenses thereto, there were several Supreme 
Court cases this term in which other types of claims were alleged, but 
which nevertheless hold considerable significance for labor and employ-
ment lawyers. I have already mentioned the Title IX sexual harassment 
vicarious liability case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dis-
trict.86 Another important case, Baker v. General Motors Corp.,87 in-
volved the company's unsuccessful effort to apply the Full Faith and 
Credit clause of the Constitution to enforce a Michigan court injunction 
obtained in the course of settlement of a former employee's wrongful 
82. See 107 F.3d at 1054. Indeed, a precipitating factor behind Caterpillar's institu-
tion of federal court litigation was the union's filing of Section 8(aX5) refusal to bargain 
in good faith charges when the employer unilaterally ceased making such payments, 
after a nationwide collective bargaining dispute between the parties resulted in the union 
members working without a labor contract. 
83. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane), cerL granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), cerL 
dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46.1, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). 
84. 443 u.s. 193 (1979). 
85. 480 u.s. 616 (1987). 
86. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). This decision is discussed in Weiss, supra note 9, at 
275-88. 
87. 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998). 
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termination lawsuit in a Missouri products liability action. The Michi-
gan injunction would have precluded the former employee from testi-
fying against the employer.88 The Supreme Court held that the interest 
of the second state in full access to potential evidence in its judicial 
search for the truth outweighed Michigan's interest in enforcing its 
injunction prohibiting the former employee's testimony.89 The Court 
recognized this situation as entailing an exception to the usual Full 
Faith and Credit clause requirement that such foreign judgments be 
enforced as though they were the second state's own.90 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner91 arose out of a products liability action 
against producers of chemicals and equipment used in the workplace 
by an employee who allegedly suffered cancer from on-the-job exposure. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve issues of appropriate 
expert witness testimony in such a context, and upheld broad discretion 
vested in the district court regarding such rulings.92 
In Crawford-el v. Britton,93 a Section 1983 prisoner's rights case, a 
five to four majority of the Court rejected a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard or other heightened burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking 
to establish constitutional tort claims against government officials 
where motive is the gravamen of the claim. Because many cases of 
unconstitutional government action turning on motives are employ-
ment cases, this holding is an important one for labor and employment 
law specialists. 
Likewise significant are this term's ADA cases. In Bragdon v. Ab-
bott,94 a suit by an HIV-infected patient against her dentist under the 
public accommodations provisions of the ADA, the Court rendered a 
series of interpretations which, while technically involving another por-
tion of the statute, will be followed under the employment provisions 
contained in Title I. This opinion is likely to become a landmark ADA 
decision, and will be addressed in depth below. 
A second, non-employment ADA case, Pennsylvania Dep't of Correc-
tions v. Yeskey,95 should also be mentioned. There, in an opinion written 
by Justice Scalia, a unanimous Court held that the Title II ADA prohibi-
tion against disability-based discrimination by a "public entity" against 
a "qualified individual with a disability" applies to state prisons as 
public entities and to prison inmates. Reasoning literally from the text 
of the statute, the Court concluded that prison inmates may be deemed 
"qualified individuals with a disability," hence protected against dis-
88. ld. 
89. ld. at 667-68. 
90. ld. at 668. 
91. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). 
92. ld. at 515. 
93. 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998). 
94. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
95. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998). 
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crimination, provided they are qualified or eligible to participate in the 
particular prison benefit or opportunity. In Yeskey, the plaintiff had 
been refused admission to a motivational bootcamp, which could have 
substantially shortened his period of incarceration, because of his medi-
cal history of hypertension. The Court, however, expressly declined to 
reach the question of whether application of the ADA to state prisons 
is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Interstate 
Commerce clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. 96 
This article now turns to a deeper examination of the most signifi-
cant cases: the NLRA case, Allentown Mack, the employee benefits un-
constitutional takings case, Eastern Enterprises, and the ADA case, 
Bragdon v. Abbott. 
IV. Allentown Mack 
In Allentown Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations 
Board,91 the Court addressed the NLRB's requirement that an employer 
have a "good faith reasonable doubt, based on objective considerations," 
that the incumbent union continued to enjoy the support of a majority of 
the employees before the employer could permissibly poll the employees' 
union sentiment. The Board's standard was upheld, but its application 
to the facts in the case at bar was overturned.98 
The case arose after Mack Trucks sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania 
operations to a group of its managers who founded Allentown Mack 
Sales and Service, Inc. The Mack Truck service and parts employees 
had been represented by Machinists Local Lodge 724 and the newly 
created employer hired thirty-two of the forty-five employees who had 
constituted the bargaining unit under Mack Trucks.99 
Because Allentown Mack was a successor employer to Mack 
Trucks, 100 the union was entitled to be treated as an incumbent union 
96. Id. at 1956. 
97. 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
98. ld. at 829. 
99. Id. at 820·21. Every employee initially hired was a former Mack employee. 
Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
100. After trial on the union's unfair labor practice charges, the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ), aft1rmed by the Board, found Allentown Mack to be a successor employer. 
316 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1199, 1204 (1995). This finding was not challenged before the Court 
of Appeals, see 118 S. Ct. at 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
hence was not at issue before the Supreme Court. The employer satisfied both the "hired a 
majority ofthepredecessor's employees" test, see Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 
Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249,263 (1974), and the "majority of the employees 
hired by the new employer" test. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serve., 406 U.S. 272, 281 
(1972); Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 41 (1987). See 
generally DEVELOPING LABoR LAW, supra note 62, at 781-851. 
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which had no collective bargaining agreement in effect.101 Allentown 
Mack was required to assume its predecessor's duty to bargain in good 
faith with the union, and the union was entitled to the benefit of a 
rebuttable presumption of continued majority status.102 
Soon after Allentown Mack rehired a majority of the bargaining unit 
employees and commenced operations, the union demanded recognition 
and requested commencement of bargaining for a new labor contract.103 
The employer, in a written reply, refused to bargain, asserted a good 
faith doubt as to the union's majority status, and advised the union of 
its arrangements for "an independent poll by secret ballot of its hourly 
employees to be conducted under guidelines prescribed by the National 
Labor Relations Board."104 
Allentown Mack arranged for a Catholic priest to conduct a poll of 
the employees' support for the union. The union lost by a vote of 19 to 
13.105 The employer then relied on the outcome to reiterate its refusal 
to bargain with the union, claiming a demonstrated lack of majority 
status. The union filed unfair labor practice charges. The Administra-
tive Law Judge (ALJ), affirmed by the Board, found the employer to have 
conducted the poll in procedural compliance with the NLRB's Struksnes 
requirements, 106 but held that the employer had lacked a reasonable 
doubt, based on objective considerations, that the union retained the 
support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. 107 The polling, 
and the refusal to bargain based on its results, were therefore held to 
have violated § § 8(aX1) and 8(aX5).108 
The D.C. Circuit panel, with one member in dissent, enforced the 
Board's order .109 The Court of Appeals rejected the employer's challenge 
to the Board's standard for polling, despite conflicting precedent in three 
other Circuits.110 The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had adopted a 
weaker predicate for employer polling, that polls are permitted if the 
101. See Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. at 38-40 (same policies in 
favor of preserving industrial peace, stability of the bargaining relationship, and avoiding 
providing the employer with incentives to delay bargaining in hopes of undermining 
support for the union apply in incumbent union setting and in successorship context, 
and lead to application of duty to bargain in good faith based on presumption of continued 
majority status). 
102. See id. at 41 & n.8. See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 62, at 
790-97. 
103. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 821. 
104. ld. 
105. ld. 
106. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967). 
107. Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1199. 
108. Id. 
109. 83 F.3d at 1488. 
110. 83 F.3d at 1485-87 (citing NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Thomas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982); Mingtree Restau· 
rant, Inc. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
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employer has "substantial, objective evidence of a loss of union support" 
as opposed to loss of union majority status.111 The Court of Appeals 
likewise found substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support 
the Board's conclusion that only seven of thirty-two bargaining unit 
employees had been shown to have declined to support the union, prior 
to the polling, an insufficient number to support a good faith, reasonable 
doubt of continued majority status.112 A narrowly divided Supreme 
Court reversed, upholding the traditional formulation of the polling 
standard, but overturning its application.113 
The majority decision was written by Justice Scalia, with two sepa-
rate groups of four Justices joining in each of the two key holdings, to 
produce a majority opinion whose entirety was subscribed to only by 
Justice Scalia. The portion of the opinion upholding the NLRB standard, 
Part II, was joined in by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer; 
the portion rejecting the Board's application of the standard, and hold-
ing that the employer had a sufficient objective basis to poll the work-
force, Parts III and IV of the opinion, was joined in by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
A. The NLRB Standard 
Justice Scalia's reasoning upholding the NLRB polling standard 
starts with the recitation of conventional formulae requiring judicial 
deference to the NLRB's construction of the Act: "courts must defer to 
the requirements imposed by the Board if they are 'rational and consis-
tent with the Act,' " 114 and provided that "the Board's 'explication is 
not inadequate, irrational or arbitrary.' " 115 
The NLRB has applied the same criteria to employer polling, em-
ployer petitions for a representation election (RM petition) when there is 
an incumbent union, and unilateral employer withdrawal of recognition 
and refusal to bargain with an incumbent union when no collective 
bargaining agreement is in effect.116 In all three situations, absent a 
contract bar, certification bar, or recognition bar, 117 the Board treats 
the employer as having to overcome the incumbent union's rebuttable 
111. 83 F.3d at 1485-86 & 1486 n.3 (citing A. W. Thompson, 651 F.2d at 1145; Thomas 
Indus., Inc., 687 F.2d at 869; Mingtree Restaurant, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1299). 
112. Id. at 1487-88. 
113. 118 S. Ct. at 829. 
114. I d. at 822 (quoting Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 
27' 42 (1987)). 
115. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)). 
116. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989), enfd as modified, 
923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991). 
117. The three year contract bar, the one year bar following certification, and the 
bar for "a reasonable period" of time to negotiate an initial contract after voluntary 
recognition of the union by the employee each entitle the union to the benefit of an 
irrebuttable presumption of majority status for the duration of the bar period. See generally 
I DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 62, at 571-73. 
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presumption of continued majority support. The employer must rely on 
objective evidence sufficient to raise a good faith reasonable doubt of 
the union's majority status. 118 
The five members of the Supreme Court who were in accord on this 
point found the Board's application of a single standard to polling, RM 
petitions, and withdrawals of recognition to be rational, hence entitled 
to deference, despite the fact that it was less than a model of logical 
consistency .119 The employer had argued that if the same showing was 
required to poll as to withdraw recognition, polling was rendered useless 
for the only purpose for which it is permitted by the NLRB: to establish 
the union's loss of majority support as a defense to a bad faith bargaining 
charge when the employer withdraws recognition. The Court, however, 
accepted the reasonableness of the Board's view that polling is "disrup-
tive" to established bargaining relationships as well as "unsettling to 
employees." The Court also recognized that there are other reasons to 
justify polling, even when polling is limited to ascertaining employee 
union sentiment. Such reasons may include preserving good employee 
morale and a semblance of employee freedom of choice, and avoiding 
a pyrrhic victory for the employer of validly withdrawing recognition 
followed by the union winning a victory in an NLRB election.120 
The core of the employer's argument was that the test for polling 
should be lower than that for unilateral employer withdrawal of recogni-
tion. This contention was deemed less persuasive when juxtaposed with 
a comparison between the standard for polling and that for seeking an 
RM election. As the Court of Appeals elaborated more explicitly than 
the Supreme Court, it is difficult to reject the logic of the argument 
that the employer should not be allowed to conduct a poll-which has the 
same purpose as an RM election, but lacks the procedural protections-
when the Board would refuse to conduct an RM election.121 The Supreme 
Court majority acknowledged that the RM election/polling comparison 
could yield competing arguments for either higher or lower standards 
for one versus the other, and concluded: "if it would be rational for 
the Board to set the polling standard either higher or lower than the 
threshold for an RM election, then surely it is not irrational for the 
Board to split the difference."122 
The four dissenters on this issue, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, disputed the statutory textual basis for the Board's standard 
which they asserted in fact operates to interfere with employee free 
118. See generally Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges 
to an Incumbent Union, 1991 WJB. L. REV. 653. 
119. A useful discussion of the competing comparisons and their rationales may be 
found in Flynn, supra note 118, at 660. 
120. 118 S. Ct. at 809. 
121. Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1486 (following Texas Petrochemical Corp., 296 
N.L.R.B. at 1060). 
122. 118 S. Ct. at 823. 
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choice.123 Alternatively, the dissent as to this part of the decision rea-
soned that, in light of the gravity of the consequences, the application of 
an identical standard to polling, RM elections, and unilateral employer 
withdrawal of recognition is irrational. The dissenters contended that 
because of the one year election bar, the consequences of a lost RM 
election for the union are more severe than that of polling. They con-
clude, therefore, that the polling standard should be set lower than that 
for either RM elections or withdrawal of recognition.124 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist' s opinion alludes to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 125 to advance 
a suggestion that employer polling may be subject to § 8(c) and First 
Amendment free speech protections, based on the employer's right to 
receive information, by analogy to the union's similar right in other 
contexts.126 The mere presence of a constitutional concern, these four 
justices would hold, renders "the Board's interpretation of the Act 
... not entitled to deference."127 
The dissent, however, mentions neither Gissel nor Linden Lumber128 
when it impliedly equates the reliability of a unilateral instrument, the 
employer-conducted poll, with that of an election conducted by a neutral 
governmental agency.129 Only when the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices "impair the electoral process" are a union's authorization cards ac-
cepted as a second-best measure to ascertain and effectuate employee rep-
resentation wishes and bind the employer to a duty to bargain.130 Neither 
union authorization cards, nor a ballot conducted independently at the 
behest of the union, will bind an unconsenting employer to bargain.131 
Four justices, however, would permit an employer's unilaterally-
conducted poll to bind an unconsenting union and employees, to the ex-
tent that the employer would be entitled to terminate the bargaining re-
lationship without prior invocation of NLRB processes. 
The fifth Justice, Scalia, seemingly felt duty bound by administra-
tive law precepts to defer to the NLRB's judgment to the contrary on 
the matter of statutory interpretation embodied in the text of the polling 
standard. Along with these four dissenters, however, in the remainder 
123. Id. at 831. 
124. Id. at 832. 
125. 395 u.s. 575, 616-17 (1969). 
126. 118 S. Ct. at 832-33. 
127. Id. at 833 (citing, inter alia, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
Bldg. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,574-77 (1988); and NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago, 440 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1979)). 
128. Linden Lumber v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). 
129. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 831-32. 
130. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 304, 306, 310. See also Gissel, 395 U.S. at 601-609 
(despite inferiority of cards to Board-conducted election as a reliable indicator of employee 
sentiment, cards are sufficiently valid to provide a substitute measure of employee senti-
ment when employer unfair labor practices have substantially reduced the possibility 
of a fair election). 
131. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310. See generally I DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra 
note 62, at 558-60; id., 1997 Supp. at 214. 
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of his opinion he overturns in practice the polling standard he purports 
to approve in theory. 
B. Rejection of Application of the Polling Standard: The Dictionary 
as Primary Interpretative Source 
In Parts III and IV of the opinion, Justice Scalia, this time joined by 
the Chief Justice, along with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, 
overturns the Board's finding that the employer had failed to demon-
strate its good faith doubt of the union's majority status based on objec-
tive evidence. Justice Scalia rejected the Board's own construction of 
its use of the phrase "good faith doubt," to mean "disbelief." He relied 
on Webster's New International Dictionary to support instead the inter-
pretation of "uncertainty," rather than affirmative denial of belief in 
the truth of the assertion.132 One could characterize the approach of the 
majority opinion to interpretation of the Board's test, which the Board 
had articulated through the adjudicatory process, as akin to Justice 
Scalia's strict, literal method of construction of a congressionally-
enacted statute. 
Justice Scalia couples the reinterpretative analysis of the "good 
faith doubt" standard with a recasting of the judicial review test of 
Universal Camera Corp. 133 "Substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole" is transmuted into "whether on this record it would have been 
possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board's conclusion. " 134 Courts 
of Appeals have treated this as a standard of review of fact-finding 
highly deferential to the agency.135 However, under this approach, the 
Board's expertise in the field of industrial relations is written out of 
any role in evaluating evidence.136 Moreover, the Court's language 
construing the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review to 
require that the Board not ignore or underweight pertinent record evi-
dence137 lends itself to expansive judicial reassessment of NLRB fact-
finding determinations and evaluative judgrnents.138 
In the course of a few lines, the opinion restates and transforms the 
basis for the NLRB ruling against Allentown Mack. In the original, 
132. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 823. 
133. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
134. 118 S. Ct. at 823. 
135. See, e.g., Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) ("[T]his is a highly deferential standard of review.") 
136. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
137. ld. at 828. See infra text accompanying notes 179-187. 
138. See, e.g., Pirelli Cable Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F.3d 503, 519 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Allentown Mack to support its reasoning that "the Board interpreted the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Union. The Board is not at liberty to accept only those eviden-
tiary inferences that support the union's position and reject all of those that support the 
employer. Based upon the evidence before the Board, no reasonable person could have 
concluded that the membership of the union struck over the employer's alleged threat 
of discharge if the employees exercised their right to strike."). 
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the employer is held to have violated the Act because it "ha[d] not 
demonstrated that it held a reasonable doubt, based on objective consid-
erations, that the union continued to enjoy the support of a majority 
of the bargaining unit employees."139 As the Board understood its own 
formulation, the employer had to actually disbelieve that the union had 
maintained majority support, that disbelief had to have been based 
on objective evidence, and had to have been reasonable under all the 
circumstances.140 
Justice Scalia's interpretation transforms the question before the 
Court into "whether, on the evidence presented to the Board, a reason-
able jury could have found that Allentown lacked a genuine, reasonable 
uncertainty about whether Local 724 enjoyed the continuing support 
of a majority of the unit employees,"141 a question the Court immediately 
answers, "No."142 In addtion, the Part III majority explicitly interprets 
its rewritten standard not to require disavowals of the union by half 
or more of the employees.143 
In particular, the Court weighed quite differently from the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and the Board the representations made to the em-
ployer by two employees, one of them a former union shop steward, 
of not only their own dissatisfaction with the union, but that of their 
co-workers. The majority concluded that as a matter oflaw, a sufficient 
basis existed to establish "uncertainty whether a majority in favor of 
the union existed," that is, in the majority's translation, the employer 
had an objective basis to support a good faith doubt of continued majority 
status.144 
This portion of the opinion is troublesome in several respects. In the 
first place, however appropriate Justice Scalia's literal interpretation 
approach to rules that are the product oflegislative or regulatory formu-
lation, it seems misplaced when applied to adjudicatorily developed 
139. Id. at 823 (citing 316 N.L.R.B. at 1199). 
140. See Transcript of Oral Argument in Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 
1997 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 45, *26 ("The board's standard means the employer must have 
a solid, reasonable basis for believing that the union has lost majority support. The board 
is not using the term doubt here to mean uncertainty. It is using that term to mean 
disbelieO; id. at *27 (Mr. Chief Justice, the term doubt does have two different meanings. 
One of them means vague uncertainty, and that is the way in which we use it in the 
criminal law context. I think the board has been quite clear that that's not what it means 
when it uses the term. Here, doubt means disbelief, and what the employer has to show 
is a solid basis for believing."). 
141. 118 S. Ct. at 823. 
142. /d. at 823-24. The dissent shines a brilliant spotlight on this sleight of hand. 
See id. at 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
143. "The Board did not specify how many express disavowals would have been 
enough to establish reasonable doubt, but the number must presumably be less than 16 
(half ofthe bargaining unit), since that would establish reasonable certainty." /d. at 824. 
144. /d. at 825. This evidentiary conclusion is also intertwined with the majority's 
redefinition of "objective evidence" discussed infra text accompanying notes 146-169, 
178. 
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standards. The portion of the decision advocating deference to reason-
able agency interpretation of the statute it is charged to administer 
(Part II) is in considerable tension with the highly non-deferential, for-
malistic analysis of the objectively based, good faith reasonable doubt 
standard in the subsequent part (Part III) of the opinion. Justice Breyer 
characterizes the second half of Justice Scalia's opinion baldly: "It has 
rewritten a Board rule without adequate justification. . . . The only 
authority cited for the transformation [is] the dictionary."145 
Second, based on what the Court does, rather than what it says it 
does, it is as if the different majority in Parts III and IV of the decision 
overrules or at least saps of all vitality the reasoning of the majority 
in Part II. The formulation adopted by the majority in Part III is opera-
tionally a much weaker standard than that expressed and applied by 
the Board, supposedly accepted by the Court in Part II. In addition, the 
Part III and IV majority's rewriting of the NLRB "objective reasonable 
doubt" standard may render it functionally indistinguishable from the 
more relaxed standard of the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, firmly 
rejected by the majority in Part II. 
The employer's argument urging adoption of the Circuit Courts' 
alternative standard was rejected by the Board and Court of Appeals 
in Allentown Mack, and ostensibly was rejected by a majority of the 
Court in Part II of Justice Scalia's opinion on behalf of the opposite 
line-up of Justices to those signing on to this later segment of the opin-
ion. Nevertheless, whether it is harder for an employer to demonstrate 
that it "lacked a genuine, reasonable uncertainty about whether [the 
union] enjoyed the continuing support of a majority of unit employ-
ees"146 (the Allentown Mack majority's rewritten version of the NLRB 
standard) as compared to showing that it had "substantial, objective 
evidence of a loss of union support" (the Fifth/Sixth/Ninth Circuit stan-
dard rejected by the Board and ostensibly the Court in Allentown Mack) 
is highly questionable. The answer depends on what evidence counts 
as "substantial" and "objective,"147 as well as on whether "uncertainty" 
as to a union majority means a greater, smaller, or equivalent decline 
in union adherents compared to "loss of union support." What seems 
clear is that Courts of Appeals may now revisit NLRB fact-finding, 
applying a facially unchanged standard of" objective reasonable doubt," 
whenever in the judges' view the employer had a "genuine, reasonable 
uncertainty" about the union's continuing majority status. It is difficult 
to reconcile this test with Part II' s adoption by the Court of the existing 
Board formula, as well as its proclamation of continued deference to 
the Board's non-arbitrary elaboration of such interpretations of the Act. 
145. ld. at 833, 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
146. ld. at 823. 
14 7. For the Allentown Mack Part ill and IV majority's loose definition of"objective," 
see infra text accompanying note 147. 
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Whatever this reinterpreted standard of good faith doubt of majority 
support means, it may well be applied to all three areas to which the 
Board has heretofore traditionally applied the "objective reasonable 
doubt" standard. The employer's threshold appears by this decision to 
have been lowered not only as to polling, but also as to the filing of an 
RM petition, and as to unilateral withdrawal of recognition from an 
incumbent union. Both on the merits and on the Court's peculiar and 
uneven approach to deference to agency interpretation of the statute 
it is charged to administer, the decision is highly significant. 
C. The "Objective" Nature of Three Key Pieces of Evidence 
That is not, however, the end of the matter. Justice Scalia's reason-
ing about proper assessment of the evidence appears to overturn a good 
bit of additional NLRB precedent. Allentown Mack may presage a hos-
tile judicial attitude toward long-standing Board rules about evaluating 
evidence regarding employee attitudes, sentiments, or reactions, in con-
texts other than determining union majority status. The majority's 
"genuine reasonable uncertainty" version is based on more than simple 
replacement of "honest disbelief'' in interpreting "good faith doubt."148 
"Objective evidence" is also effectively reevaluated by the Court, again 
with the dictionary as virtually the only source cited in support, to 
mean "evidence external to the employer's own (subjective) impres-
sions."149 The idea that the evidence should be minimally subject to 
employer taint or manipulation, implicit in the NLRB's several perti-
nent lines of precedent about evaluating and weighting indirect evi-
dence of employees' union sentiments, is thereby sucked out of the 
phrase without debate on the merits. 
A review of the pertinent evidence is in order. To support its entitle-
ment to poll, the employer pointed to comments by seven bargaining 
unit members, during pre-hire interviews, individually disavowing sup-
port for the union. 150 On the ALJ's accounting, express disavowals of 
148. See id. at 823. 
149. Responding to Justice Breyer's dissent, the majority defmes "objective" in a 
footnote: "[T]he meaning of the word has nothing to do with the force, as opposed to 
the source, of the considerations supporting the employer's doubt .... Requiring the 
employer's doubt to be based on 'objective' considerations reinforces the requirement 
that the doubt be 'reasonable,' imposing on the employer the burden of showing that it 
was supported by evidence external to the employer's own (subjective) impressions." !d. 
at 823 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing WEBSTER's NEw INrERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1679 (2d 
ed. 1949)). 
150. Compare id. at 821 (contention that eight employees had expressed anti·union 
sentiment) with 83 F.3d at 1487·88 (accepting the Board's contention that only seven 
out ofthirty.two bargaining unit employees as of the date the employer announced the 
poll had expressed anti-union sentiment to management) and 118 S. Ct. at 835 (Breyer, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the ALJ's decision as identifying 
only six or seven employees with suitable statements, explaining the differences in compu· 
tation). The employer originally also attempted to rely on statements of employees hired 
subsequent to the date of announcement of its plan to conduct the poll, but the Board 
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the union by "7 of 32, or roughly 20 percent of the involved employees" 
was insufficient to support the employer's claim of good faith doubt. 151 
The Allentown Mack Parts III and IV majority opinion first notes that 
a sufficient number of employee disavowals of the union "must presum-
ably be less than 16 (half of the bargaining unit), since that would 
establish reasonable certainty.152 Next, the majority concedes, "we 
would not say that 20% first-hand confirmed opposition (even with no 
countering evidence of union support) is alone enough to require a con-
clusion of reasonable doubt."153 Additional evidence of the union senti-
ments of the remainder of the unit must therefore decide the outcome. 
Allentown Mack had cited three additional, critical pieces of evi-
dence: (1) a statement by a mechanic working on the night shift who 
claimed that no one on that shift's complement of five or six workers 
supported the union; (2) one employee's statement expressing dissatis-
faction with the representation afforded him by the union; and (3) a 
statement by one of the union's shop stewards that the employees did 
not want the union, and that if an election were held, the union would 
lose.154 
The Supreme Court differed sharply with the lower tribunal in 
evaluating these three pieces of evidence. The ALJ, the Board, and 
the Court of Appeals had applied three or perhaps four lines ofNLRB 
case law discrediting the evidentiary value of specific types of em-
ployee statements other than express disavowals of support for the 
union, when relied on by the employer as "objective" evidence to 
support a claim of good faith doubt of union majority status. They 
therefore placed little or no weight on any of the three additional 
employee statements, and found the evidence insufficient to support 
the employer's claimed good faith doubt. The difference in treatment 
of this evidence by the Supreme Court majority may be every bit as 
significant an outcome of Allentown Mack as the Court's reconstruc-
held that the objective, reasonable doubt had to be determined as of the date of the decision 
to conduct the poll, hence disregarded those other employee's alleged attestation of non-
support for the union. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1206-07. The Court does not comment on the 
propriety of this well established Board precedent. 
151. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1207, quoted in Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824. 
152. 118 S. Ct. at 824 (emphasis added). This proposition, of course, is premised on 
the earlier holding interpreting "reasonable doubt" to mean "reasonable uncertainty" 
rather than actual and reasonable disbelief in the union's majority support. See supra 
text accompanying notes 132-139. 
153. I d. (emphasis added). The rather remarkable negative implication of that sen-
tence might be understood to mean that conilruled, flrst hand evidence of opposition to 
the union on the part of 20 per cent of the bargaining unit could suffice to support a 
Board decision permitting the employer to unilaterally poll, or even withdraw recognition. 
Absent the one year election bar, this theory would allow the great majority of employers 
whose employees have just, by majority vote, chosen union representation, to withdraw 
recognition and refuse to bargain, since the union rarely wins 80 per cent of the vote in 
modern Board-conducted elections. 
154. 118 S. Ct. at 821. 
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tion of the Board's objective, reasonable doubt standard, replacing 
affirmative "disbelier' with mere "uncertainty." 
In the first line of precedents, in the Court's words, "the Board has 
consistently questioned the reliability of reports by one employee ofthe 
antipathy of other employees toward their union. "155 In fact, the weight 
the Board gives to second or third hand testimony about other employ-
ees' sentiments depends on the extent to which the witness can provide 
details about the direct and intermediate sources of the information, 
the circumstances under which it was gathered, and other assurances 
of its reliability and accuracy. The second body of Board precedent 
"holds that an employee's statement of dissatisfaction with the quality 
of union representation may not be treated as opposition to union repre-
sentation."156 The third line of"Board precedent holds that an employer 
may not rely on an employee's anti-union sentiments, expressed during 
a job interview in which the employer has indicated that there will be 
no union. Such employee expressions are unlikely to be sincere."157 
The Supreme Court treats the three pieces of evidence, and the 
three related bodies ofNLRB precedent, in two different portions of the 
opinion. In Part ill, the Court in effect evaluates the testimony about 
each of the three employee statements as though the NLRB precedents 
regarding their weight and credibility did not exist. The Court treats 
as the only issue the question of whether the employer, presented with 
such employee statements, could reasonably and in good faith doubt 
the union's majority status. The notion of objectiveness ofthe evidence, 
in the sense that the evidence be of a sort that an outside, neutral 
observer would believe reliable, uninfluenced by the employer's own, 
expressed or unexpressed desire that the union majority disappear, has 
vanished from the analysis. Naturally, the Court finds the evidence 
sufficient to support the employer's right to conduct the poll.158 
The ALJ evaluated the words of the employee who expressed dissat-
isfaction with his union representation as "more an expression of a 
desire for better representation than one for no representation at all."159 
The Court, noting the ambiguity, assesses the statement as creditable 
toward establishing the employer's good faith doubt: "the statement 
would assuredly engender an uncertainty whether the speaker sup-
ported the union, and so could not be entirely ignored."160 
Hearsay testimony by an Allentown Mack manager, attributing to 
one night shift employee the assertion that "the entire night shift did 
155. I d. at 829 (quoting Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488, citing three NLRB decisions 
and two Court of Appeals precedents dating back as far as 1978). 
156. I d. (quoting Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488). 
157. ld. (quoting Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488). 
158. See id. at 825. 
159. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1207, quoted in Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824. 
160. 118 S. Ct. at 824. 
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not want the union," was disregarded by the lower tribunals.161 The 
Supreme Court majority acknowledged that "[u]nsubstantiated asser-
tions that other employees do not support the union certainly do not 
establish the fact of that disfavor with the degree of reliability ordinarily 
demanded in legal proceedings."162 The Court, however, reasoned that 
it is not the fact of employee disaffection from the union that is at issue, 
"but rather the existence of a reasonable uncertainty on the part of the 
employer regarding that fact. "163 Similarly, while there was no evidence 
of any factual foundation for the union steward's "feeling that the em-
ployees did not want a union," and that the union would lose a vote, 
if one were taken, 164 the majority deemed it surely a contributing factor 
"to a reasonable uncertainty whether a majority in favor of the union 
existed .... Allentown would reasonably have given great credence to 
Mohr's assertion of lack of union support since he was not hostile to 
the union, and was in a good position to assess anti-union sentiment."165 
Nearly all of the statements were made either in the context of 
a potential successor employer drawn from incumbent management 
deciding whether to buy the plant and save some of the employees' 
jobs or, shortly thereafter, in the course of interviews by the successor 
employer, hiring employees who were well aware of the employer's 
desire to operate without a union. This fact plays no role in the Court's 
analysis. It has no bearing on the "objectivity" of the evidence, in so 
far as real employees, external to the employer's imagination, actually 
did make the statements attributed to them. However, if "objectivity" 
has something to do with the quality of the evidence, and if"objectivity" 
connotes an unbiased, accurate ascertainment of what the employees 
really wanted, rather than what they thought the successor employer 
wanted to hear, one would have to regard every bit of the evidence as 
too tainted to be relied upon.166 The Board's position did not go nearly 
this far, occupying a middle ground in weighting evidence of doubtful 
reliability. 
Nor did the Court majority deem it significant that the two most 
important pieces of evidence were testified to before the ALJ by mem-
bers of management rather than the employees quoted as having made 
the statements. Managerial witnesses testified about night shift worker 
Bloch's statement about the night shift workers' wish to leave the union, 
161. ld. at 821. 
162. Id. at 824. 
163. Id. 
164. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1207-08. 
165. 118 S. Ct. at 825. 
166. The extreme position rejecting employee statements made under such inherently 
coercive conditions as invariably unreliable, on the other hand, might tend to disenfran-
chise the voice of workers unhappy with union representation, even when a solid majority, 
or even supermajority wished to be rid of the union entirely apart from the hiring or 
successorship context in which the statements were made. · 
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as well as about the statement about widespread employee disaffection 
with the union, attributed to Mohr, the union steward. Precisely because 
this was second-hand testimony, no details were provided which might 
have permitted an assessment of the accuracy and reliability of the 
circumstances under which the intermediary employees, quoted as to 
their understanding of the group sentiment, gathered their informa-
tion.167 In so far as the issue was the truth of the underlying matter, 
the real views of the employees, this was third hand, not even second 
hand testimony. Worse still, the evidence was based on testimony by 
a member of management, whose employment position creates an anti-
union self-interest susceptible of influencing the witness' recollection 
of the wording of statements about employees' union sentiments.168 
To the Court, however, the NLRB's routine application of its prece-
dents limiting the value of each of the three pieces of indirect evidence 
was a "refusal to credit probative circumstantial evidence."169 The ma-
jority opinion gives some weight to the equivocal statement of the em-
ployee who was dissatisfied with the representation he was getting in 
return for his union dues, 170 concludes that the statement by the em-
ployee that his night shift co-workers did not want the union should 
"be given considerable weight,"171 and that the union steward's state-
ment to the effect that the employees, if given the chance, would vote 
out the union, "has undeniable and substantial probative value on the 
issue of 'reasonable doubt.' " 172 
Finally, the majority presented its mathematical analysis of this 
situation: since seven employees expressly disavowed support for the 
union, the other "25 would have had to support the union by a margin 
of 17 to 8-a ratio of more than 2 to 1" for the union to have maintained 
majority status.173 The night shift employees' disaffection and the stew-
ard's statement, the Court reasons, "would cause anyone to doubt that 
167. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1200, 1207-08. See 
also Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488. 
168. At least some of the Administrative Law Judges applying the NLRA, however, 
seem to have avoided following Allentown Mack to its logical conclusion. See, e.g., 
Transpersonnel, Inc., 1998 NLRB LEXIS 316, at *32-34 (May 27, 1998), distinguishing 
Allentown Mack and declining to credit manager's testimony quoting employee as to 
co-workers' disaffection with the union, where manager was well aware employee was 
a non·member, long opposed to the union, and where manager had induced employee's 
further statements). 
169. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824. 
170. Id. ("The statement would assuredly engender an uncertainty whether the 
speaker supported the union, and so could not be entirely ignored."). 
171. I d. (As to the Allentown manager's testimony regarding his recollection of what 
Bloch, the night shift worker, said to the manager about disaffection for the union among 
the night shift employees, the Court held, "absent some reason for the employer to know 
that Block had no basis for his information, or that Block was lying, reason demands 
that the statement be given considerable weight."). 
172. ld. at 825. 
173. Id. 
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degree of support ... "174 The Court concludes that "giving fair weight 
to Allentown's circumstantial evidence, we think it quite impossible 
for a rational factfinder to avoid the conclusion that Allentown has 
reasonable, good faith grounds to doubt-to be uncertain about-the 
union's retention of majority support."176 
As the majority accuses the ALJ, NLRB, and Court of Appeals either 
of not "giving fair weight to Allentown's circumstantial evidence" or 
of not being "rational" in their fact-finding, or both, one should pause 
to unpack the Court's own arithmetic. First, the Court is characterizing 
as "circumstantial evidence" of the real union sentiments of the employ-
ees something not usually accorded that label-third hand evidence, 
based on second hand statements, with no explicit testimony about the 
first hand statements of the employees whose views are in issue. Second, 
the statement by the one employee who was not sure he was getting 
his dues money's worth in union representation could perhaps be labeled 
circumstantial evidence of the employee's own union sentiments. It is, 
however, hard to label arbitrary or irrational the interpretation of the 
NLRB that standing alone, statements of dissatisfaction with the qual-
ity of an incumbent union's representation are not probative of a desire 
to get rid of the union, rather than change its leadership or practices. 
Were there additional information suggesting the employee's desire to 
work without a union, one could treat the at-most ambiguous statement 
as corroborative or probative of that individual employee's desires about 
union representation. 
The Allentown Mack Part ill and IV majority is largely composed of 
those members of the Court-the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Scalia-who have been extremely reluctant to interpret 
stray remarks, statements by managers not directly involved in the 
employment decisionmaking process, or other forms of indirect as well 
as circumstantial evidence, as probative of the employer's unlawful 
motive under Title Vll in making a particular employment decision.176 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the members of the Allentown 
Mack Part ill and IV majority apply a double standard in their assess-
ment of second hand testimony, off-handed comments, and indirect ex-
pressions of union sentiment. 
Arithmetically, the Court's reasoning here is dubious as well. When-
ever the union's majority is less than unanimous, if one presents infor-
174. ld. 
175. ld. 
176. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot justify requiring the employer 
to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor 
can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the 
decisional process itself, suffice"); id. at 280 (dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, 
C.J., and Scalia, J.) (shifting burden of persuasion as to employer's motives "not for every 
case in which plaintiff produces evidence of stray remarks in the workplace"). 
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mation only about the employees opposed to the union, a super-majority 
will be required for the union to have overall majority support among 
the bargaining unit. The Court's approach effectively eliminates the 
continuing presumption of majority support, not after considering all 
the evidence, but after considering the evidence that 20 percent of the 
employees expressly disavowed the union to the employer, mainly dur-
ing job interviews.177 Yet the Court earlier concluded that 20 percent 
was too low a number, on its own, to dictate a reasonable doubt, much 
less the actual conclusion that the union had lost its majority.178 
D. Administrative Law and Three Lines of NLRB Precedent 
Regarding the Reliability of Evidence of Employees' Support 
for the Union 
Having concluded that on its own view of the evidence, examined 
without consideration of the Board's rules for weighting it, it would 
have been impossible for a rational fact finder not to find that the em-
ployer had satisfied the Board's polling standard, the majority had al-
ready implicitly suggested that the three lines of Board precedent as 
to treatment of evidence were no longer viable. In the fourth and final 
section of the opinion, however, the Court went much further. It explic-
itly declared it to be error for the ALJ and the Board to rely on any of 
these lines of authority, rather than ad hoc "logic and sound inference 
from all the circumstances" in assessing evidence of good faith reason-
able doubt, or presumably anything else.179 Accusing the Board of sys-
tematically using words and phrases to mean something other than 
what is stated, both in connection with the polling standard and other-
wise, the Court held that this had to stop.180 Henceforth, it instructed, 
reviewing courts would examine stated NLRB standards as verbally 
expressed, and apply ordinary evidentiary rules to examine the record 
for support of the NLRB's findings of fact to support their conclusions.181 
The reasoning of the majority opinion in Parts III and IV appears 
to be constructed to obscure inferential gaps by conflating what were, 
in the original Board standard, two separate criteria the employer had 
to meet: (1) the employer had to actually possess a real, good faith doubt 
of the union's majority status based on actual evidence and not mere 
wishful thinking; and (2) the nature of that supporting evidence had 
to be not only external from the employer's imagination, but to a reason-
able degree, of a sort that an objective observer would see as sufficiently 
verifiable, accurate, and reliable to support such a judgment if, say, it 
were in opposition to the employer's wishes. The second criteria was 
expressed through the separate lines of NLRB precedent addressing 
177. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824. 
178. Id. 
179. ld. at 829. 
180. ld. at 826-28. 
181. Id. at 828-29. 
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evidentiary issues, but nevertheless, was an implicit part of the formula-
tion of the polling standard. By effectively judicially overruling these 
criteria, without squarely addressing them on their merits, the Court 
does exactly what it disavows in Part II of its the opinion: substitutes 
its judgment for the Board's expertise in matters vouchsafed to the 
Board by Congress. Ironically, the majority's approach closely resem-
bles that of the Board the Court heavily criticizes as disingenuous, if 
not deliberately misleading. 
The Court construed the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to 
apply to the NLRB's adjudicatorily developed rules, including in partic-
ular these rules about the treatment of evidence, and then in effect 
construed the requirement that agency rules not be arbitrary to require 
that they conform to plain English (perhaps for lawyers) definitions. 
This was necessary both to ensure proper judicial review, the Court 
suggested/82 and to meet administrative due process provisions embed-
ded in the APA, requiring a "scheme of 'reasoned decisionmaking.' "183 
To comply with the AP A, Justice Scalia wrote, the agency's action not 
only "must be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process 
by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational."184 
Courts set aside notice and comment regulations if not adequately 
supported by the reasons advanced by the agency, even if the rule would 
be within the agency's scope of authority. Where used like it is by the 
NLRB, the Court held, agency adjudication must be subjected to the 
same requirement. "It is hard to imagine a more violent breach of [the 
reasoned decision making] requirement than applying a rule of primary 
conduct or a standard of proof which is in fact different from the rule or 
standard formally announced.''185 Moreover, the Court reasoned, "[a]n 
agency should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even 
political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as factfinding,"186 
a thinly-veiled contention that this was exactly what the Board had 
intended to accomplish. 
Because reasoned decisionmaking demands it, and because the sys-
temic consequences of any other approach are unacceptable, the Board 
must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards 
that it enunciates in principle, such as good faith reasonable doubt 
and preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing courts are entitled to 
take those standards to mean what they say, and to conduct substantial-
evidence review on that basis. Even the most consistent ... departure 
from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal rule 
by which the agency's factfinding is to be judged.187 
182. Id. at 828. 
183. ld. at 826 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)). 
184. Id. 
185. ld. at 827. 
186. ld. at 828. 
187. Id. 
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As a result of this decision, deference to the agency's construction 
of its own statutory interpretations could be held to be inappropriate 
whenever the interpretation does not comply with ordinary legal or 
standard language usage. This is a rather dramatic shift away from 
cases like Chevron 188 and A uer v. Robbins, 189 counseling great deference 
to agency interpretations, formal or informal, of the statutes they ad-
minister and the regulations they have promulgated thereunder. In the 
space of two years, the Court has moved quite a distance from Justice 
Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that it must sustain the 
Secretary of Labor's informal construction of its salary-basis executive, 
administrative, and professional exemption test under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, so long as the Secretary's approach is "based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute," where Congress has not "directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue."190 While the Allentown Mack 
Court was clearly irate at what it perceived to be perverse administra-
tive adjudicatory practices by the NLRB, 191 the holding here is likely 
to trouble many other agencies as well. 
The result will surely produce problems for the Board extending 
beyond the polling issue, or even the objective, reasonable doubt issue 
in connection with withdrawals of recognition, refusals to bargain, and 
filing of RM petitions.192 While one may differ with the Court or the 
employer in its insinuations about the illegitimacy of the Board's mode 
of delineating adjudicatory rules governing virtually all aspects of 
NLRB practice, it is certainly true that to those not among the cogno-
scenti, NLRB decisions often use terminology that seems impenetrable. 
Political differences aside, and without regard to which political party 
188. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
189. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
190. Id. at 457 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
191. "Reasoned decision making, in which the rule announced is the rule applied, 
promotes sound results, and unreasoned decision making the opposite. The evil of a 
decision that applies a standard other than the one it enumerates spreads in both direc-
tions, preventing both consistent application of the law by subordinate agency personnel 
(notably administrative law judges), and effective review of the law by the courts .... 
(A] series of cases that exemplify in practice the divorcing of the rule announced from 
the rule applied ... frustrates judicial review. If revision of the Board's standard of proof 
can be achieved thus subtly and obliquely, it becomes a much more complicated enterprise 
for a court of appeals to determine whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion 
that the required standard has or has not been met." 118 S. Ct. at 812-28. 
192. The decision almost immediately began consequences in these directly affected 
areas. See, e.g., Pirelli Cable Corp. v. NLRB,141 F.3d503, 519-21(4th Cir. 1998)(rejecting 
§ NLRB 8(aX5) finding where employer withdrew recognition and refused to bargain 
after employees submitted decertification petition that court concluded was untainted 
by unfair labor practices, because following Allentown Mack reasoning, it had already 
rejected other NLRB factfinding and overturned ruling that strike had been caused by 
employer unfair labor practices, rendering employer's unilateral changes based on imple-
mentation of its last offer lawful); Alcon Fabricators, Div'n of Alcon Indus., 1998 NLRB 
LEXIS 411 (1998) (following Allentown Mack, crediting secondhand testimony regarding 
employee sentiment and upholding employer withdrawal of recognition). 
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dominated the Board in a given period of time, the case law has consis-
tently relied on a high level of jargon, insider terminology and eccentric 
usage. The rigid use of highly specialized, often atypical usage-based 
terminology in its decision making, however, has been ameliorated by 
the consistency of the usage, in the sense that NLRB officials and em-
ployer and union representatives who were frequent participants in 
NLRB processes understood the usage, and the NLRB internal hierar-
chy remained faithful to the substance of the precedents because ofthe 
strong constraints imposed by the terminology. 
The Allentown Mack decision will encourage litigants to challenge 
many bodies of NLRB precedent that they may find inconvenient in a 
given case, on review in the Courts of Appeals.193 This may help ensure 
full employment for labor lawyers, but it is unlikely to result in an 
improvement in the administration of the NLRA or effectuation of the 
policies of the Act. 
The Court's criticism may be valid to the extent that outsiders, 
especially the courts and Congress, have additional hurdles to overcome 
to accurately assess NLRB rulings, but the Court's construction of the 
AP A as applying to require more transparent usage by the Board seems 
highly questionable. It is not clear that the adversarial judicial review 
system is incapable of remedying any confusion on the part of reviewing 
courts. Parties before the Board rarely claim that they have been misled 
or confused by the Board's obscure usage of terminology and pyramiding 
of precedents to construct fully integrated rules on particular topics. 
The employer in Allentown Mack did not claim that it had in any 
way misunderstood the Board's standards, or that it had in fact acted 
in reliance on the standards governing polling, as formally stated, 
rather than on the basis of a full review of the applicable doctrine and 
advice of counsel competently revealing the evidentiary precedents as 
well as the objective, good faith doubt test. Such a contention would 
verge on an admission of legal malpractice by counsel. 
Rather, the employer wanted the Board to be bound by the policy 
stated in the express standard, read without integrating the evidentiary 
policies stated in other precedents, if it could not get the standard itself 
overturned. Whether the employer's argument represented sound pol-
icy under the NLRA, it is hard to see why the APA should affect the 
analysis, except to constrain the Court from doing exactly what it did: 
second-guessing the Board's standards, in areas left open under the Act, 
193. See, e.g., Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638,642-43 (6th Cir. 
1998) (rejecting the NLRB interpretation of the § 2(11) phrase "independent judgment" 
regarding the supervisory status of LPN charge nurses, on grounds, inter alia, that "[a]s 
in Allentown Mack, here the NLRB has divorced the rule announced from the rule applied" 
as well as that there was not "substantial evidence" to support the NLRB application 
of the rule). 
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and falling well within the Board's special expertise and authority to 
administer the law. 
The Court also accuses the Board of being obscure for the purpose 
of misdirecting congressional oversight and confusing the political pro-
cess. This is not, as far as my reading of the APA reveals, covered under 
the statutory concerns, unlike administrative due process for litigants 
and reasonable transparency for reviewing courts.194 Congress is fully 
capable of vindicating its own interests through the legislative and 
appropriations process, if it shares the Court's perception. The Court's 
devotion to the statutory text may have suffered a momentary lapse 
here. 
The Board is, as the Court itself noted in Allentown Mack, free to 
modify or restate its existing precedents in the form of rules that more 
accurately express the substance of the standard. Such a restatement 
of principles would be responsive to the Allentown majority's criticism 
and would impose less of a burden on the practitioner to master multiple 
lines of Board case law and integrate them to discern the entirety of 
the Board's approach to the area in question. Construing the APA to 
require the regulatory agency to perform the integrative legal work, 
rather than the legal practitioner, however, seems itself to lack mooring 
in the statutory text. Such a requirement has more in common with 
continental European civil law methods and evidences a departure from 
the traditional common law interpretative approach. 
The General Counsel has already urged the Board to reconsider its 
objective, good faith doubt standard, proposing in a pending case that 
the employer's unilateral withdrawal of recognition be flatly forbidden, 
but that either Board-conducted elections or employer polling be al-
lowed on a showing of direct evidence of actual loss of union support 
among at least 30 percent of the unit, together with objective evidence 
providing the employer with "reasonable grounds for believing that 
194. 5 U .S.C. § 553 provides for notice and public comment in the course of administra-
tive agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 sets forth notice and due process require-
ments applicable to agency adjudicatory proceedings, including notice to litigants of the 
allegations and a fair opportunity to contest them, including the right to be represented by 
counsel, to present evidence and legal argument, to confront and cross-examine opposing 
witnesses, that the agency official presiding over the hearing be impartial and not have 
participated in a prosecutorial capacity in the same or related matter, and that the agency 
render a written decision if the matter is not settled. Rulings both on the main and on 
collateral matters must be accompanied by a statement of the grounds for the decision. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law must be expressed in writing in the initial or 
recommended decision, if any, as well as in the agency's final adjudicatory decision. 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 provide for judicial review of agency adjudication. While 5 U.S.C. 
§ § 801-808 contains special provisions regarding congressional oversight of agency rulem-
aking, there is no provision for oversight of adjudicatory actions, apart from the general 
legislative oversight process. Legislative oversight of administrative adjudicatory deci-
sions would implicate significant separation of powers issues. 
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the union has lost its majority."195 The Courts will have to examine any 
change in prevailing Board rules for consistency with the Act. However, 
whether this or some other rule is adopted by the Board, it is likely 
that the holding in Allentown will lead to some form of modification 
by the Board of its rules, since the version reconstructed by the Court 
certainly expresses a far different policy for polling than any ever 
adopted by the Board. 
The larger problem for the Board is its long history of proceeding 
by adjudication rather than formal rulemaking proceedings. There is 
a large web of common law-like interpretation of the Act, which is con-
strued in a quasi-common law-like method, and it is difficult to envision 
the Board thoroughly overhauling its large corpus of precedent, whether 
through formal rulemaking or a rejuvenated adjudicatory process in 
which the Board members focus on framing their holdings in a rule-like 
fashion. 
The Board's method of developing rules through adjudication, and 
the attendant indeterminacy and uncertainty, are neither unique to it 
as a regulatory agency nor substantially different from the interpreta-
tive methods employed by American courts. If the Board's methods 
fail the Allentown Mack critique of adjudicatory interpretation, similar 
criticism could be levelled at the courts themselves. Like the Board, 
courts interpret statutes such as, for example, Title VII through common 
law jurisprudential methods, based on accumulated judicial precedents, 
integrated, reconciled, and made mutually consistent with each other 
and the statutory text. Moreover, Congressionally-enacted statutes 
would seem to often run afoul of Allentown Mack's insistence that words 
speak clearly and employ their plain English. One cannot help doubting, 
for example, whether the disparate impact provisions of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act to 
incorporate Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 196 and its progeny, incorporating 
statutory textual language partially inconsistent with Griggs or one 
or more of its progeny, would pass Justice Scalia's stringent test for 
compliance with the requirements of reasoned decision making and 
transparency for judicial review. 
Given the Justices' repeated references to the dictionary as primary 
interpretative authority, not only in this case but in several others this 
195. See NLRB Acting General Counsel Fred Feinstein's Report on Cases Decided 
fromMarch31, 1996, toJune30, 1998, 172DailyLab.Rep.(BNA)E-4(September4, 1998). 
See also Susan J. McGolrick, Federal Agencies, 06 Daily Lab Rep (BNA) S-5 (January 
11, 1999) (NLRB has under submission Chelsea Indus., Inc. (7-CA-368465) and Levitz 
Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc. (20-CA-26596), in which it is considering General Counsel 
Feinstein's proposed changes in Board practice); NLRB's Notice and Invitation to File 
Briefs in Chelsea Indus., Inc. and Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc., 1998 Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) 71 at D26 (April 14, 1998). 
196. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
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term, 197 the NLRB may not be the only administrative tribunal under 
pressure to change its habits.198 Furthermore, one could question 
whether the Court itself practices the strict, formal construction that 
it preaches. One rather obvious example is the interpretation of Title 
VII this term to impose liability on employers for their supervisors' 
sexual harassment of subordinates, subject to a judicially crafted affir-
mative defense.199 While this holding in Ellerth200 and Faraghe~01 may 
faithfully reflect the purposes of the statute, it is the antithesis ofliteral-
istic, statutory textual analysis.202 
At bottom, it is the very method of common law adjudicatory inter-
pretation of statutes, with its indeterminacy and shifting details of con-
struction, to which Justice Scalia seems to object. He obliquely accepts 
the Supreme Court precedent abjuring any requirement that the Board 
develop its rules through rulemaking rather than the adjudicatory pro-
cess.203 The gist of the holding announced in Allentown Mack, however, 
seems to require that the Board interpret its statute in a fashion more 
like an agency rule making process, and less like a common law court. 204 
This result, too, seems hard to find explicitly, or even implicitly in the 
text of the AP A. Perhaps the Court's interpretative method in this 
portion of the opinion suffers from a flaw similar to that of which the 
majority accuses the Board. 
197. The other two labor and employment law cases include Textron Lycoming Recip-
rocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Auto Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998); 
and Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998). All three majority opinions were 
authored by Justice Scalia. In two non-employment ADA cases, producing decisions that 
have a bearing on ADA employment litigation, Justices also relied upon the dictionary 
as authority: Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, 
and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); and Pennsyl-
vania v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998)(Scalia, J.). In addition, the dictionary was 
cited in at least one opinion in the following three cases last term: Clinton v. City of 
New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 n.13 (1998) (Stevens, J.); National Endowment v. Finley, 
118 S. Ct. 2168, 2180-81 (1998) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment); and 
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures TV, Inc., 118 S. Ct.1279, 1288 (1998)(Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
198. See, e.g., Biddulph v. Callahan, 1 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 1998) (following 
Allentown Mack to hold that Social Security Administration determination of facts was 
lacking requisite support of "substantial evidence" based on how a reasonable factfinder, 
rather than an eccentric agency, would interpret the evidence). 
199. See generally Weiss, supra note 9. 
200. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
201. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
202. The dissent in Ellerth rather accurately labels the affirmative defense "a piece 
of judicial legislation." 118 S. Ct. at 2271. 
203. See id. 118 S. Ct. at 827 ("The National Labor Relations Board, uniquely among 
major federal administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually all the legal 
rules in its field through adjudication rather than rulemaking") (citing NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974). Bell Aerospace holds, inter alia, that "the 
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance in the Board's 
discretion." 416 U.S. at 294. 
204. See id. at 827 (purporting to apply similar standards to judicial review ofNLRB 
policy, whether developed through the rulemaking or the adjudicatory process). 
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V. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 
Another noteworthy decision is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfef05 in 
which the Court split four-one-four over whether a provision of the Coal 
Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act of 1992206 violated either the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process clause. The 
challenged section of the statute imposed liability on the plaintiff em-
ployer for the funding of a portion of the health care benefits of coal 
miners who had worked for the company many years earlier.207 The 
fact that this employer had left the industry in 1965 played a major 
role in persuading the four member plurality, in an opinion written by 
Justice O'Connor, that the legislation was severely retroactive, hence 
unconstitutional. 208 
In the plurality's analysis, the disruption of settled expectations 
rendered the imposition of a legal duty to contribute to the statutorily-
created fund a taking of the assets of the employer, still operating in 
other business fields.209 As the plurality viewed it, Congress in essence 
imposed a duty to fund the equivalent of a defined benefit plan, despite 
the fact that the employer, at the time it left the industry, was only 
funding a defined contribution plan that limited benefits payable to 
those benefits fundable based on then-existing contributions. 210 The sub-
stantiality of the financial burden imposed on the employer, and its 
disproportionality to the employer's funding obligations when active 
in the industry under its own plan, were also key factors in the holding. 
The law was therefore deemed to "attach new legal consequences to [an 
employment relationship] completed before its attachment,"211 hence to 
"substantially interfere with Eastern's reasonable investment expecta-
tions."212 Imposing such a retroactive burden upon Eastern, the plural-
ity holds, would violate "fundamental principles of fairness underlying 
the Takings Clause. "213 
The four dissenters, Justices Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and Gins-
burg, viewed the Coal Act as falling within the scope of permissible 
social regulation and taxation. The dissenters were particularly in-
fluenced by their view that there had been an unwritten, perhaps 
legally unenforceable but nevertheless implicit commitment on the 
part of the entire coal industry, including the plaintiff former coal 
205. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). 
206. 26 u.s.c. §§ 9701·9722 (1998). 
207. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(aX3). 
208. See 118 S. Ct. at 2143. 
209. See id. at 2153 ("severely retroactive," "far in the past"); id. at 2152 ("The 
distance into the past that the Act reaches back to impose liability ... raise[s) substantial 
questions of fairness."). 
210. ld. at 2152. 
211. I d. at 2151 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)). 
212. ld. 
213. ld. at 2153. 
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employer, to ensure the promised pension and health care benefits 
to retired coal miners. 214 
Justice Kennedy, casting the decisive vote, took an extremely care-
ful approach to the problem. His opinion leans toward formalism in 
rejecting the dissenters' contention that moral or implicit promises and 
representations about miners' benefits by the industry could support 
legislated imposition of such a greatly expanded liability compared to 
that undertaken in writing during the period when Eastern Enterprises 
had been mining coal.215 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy viewed 
the doctrinal slippery slope problem posed by an expansion of takings 
doctrine as extremely dangerous, and preferred to rest his analysis on 
the substantive due process violation that he perceived to ensue from 
retroactive imposition of liability based on acts many years in the past. 
Despite the legacy of New Deal substantive due process decisions, he 
regarded the narrow and specific context of retroactive legislation as 
one carrying its own historical legacy of opprobrium within the United 
States and other democracies, and on that basis attempted to craft a 
narrowly bounded application of substantive due process doctrine.216 
It thus seems clear that a majority of this Court will overturn social 
and labor regulation if it unduly and retroactively disrupts settled em-
ployer expectations.217 However, the lack of a majority for any given 
doctrinal basis, and the fact that both bases articulated-substantive 
due process and Takings Clause doctrine-are extremely malleable and 
open to subjective judgment about the extent of disruption of expecta-
tion, the legitimacy of expectation, and the justification for the disrup-
tion, make predictions about future cases extremely difficult. On the 
one hand, the decision appears to suggest that a majority of the Court 
will resist expansive development of the Takings Clause or any other 
constitutional provision to protect entrepreneurial rights against regu-
lation in a manner reminiscent of the old substantive due process cases. 
On the other hand, the sanguine reading of a bounded approach to 
constitutional invalidation of economic legislation may have suffered 
214. Id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2165-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
215. See id. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
216. See id. at 2154-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
part). 
217. In this regard, one can view the Eastern Enterprises Court's reasoning as fitting 
within the line of Takings Clause cases that overturn legal provisions "inconsistent with 
the classical requirement of rules that are certain and knowable in advance." See Molly 
S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 
Nw. U. L. REv. 591, 650 (1998). One may also read the decision as fitting the established 
category Takings Clause cases overturning laws which unfairly single out and burden 
a handful of economic actors to accomplish a social goal benefitting many, where the 
actors are viewed as "no more responsible for the harm the regulation seeks to remedy, 
and no more benefitted by its relief, than other individuals who bear none of its economic 
costs." I d. at 652. 
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a major blow through the Eastern Enterprises decision, even though no 
new body of doctrine commanded majority support. 
Professor Molly McUsic, for example, has read the Court's Takings 
Clause approach until now as one that largely confined itself to real 
property-related restrictions, particularly environmental regulation, 
land use limitations, and other forms of regulation burdening a handful 
of property owners to benefit the entire community.218 On her institu-
tionally-based analysis, the Court has until now carefully skirted the 
post-substantive due process body of doctrine upholding economic regu-
latory legislation.219 If so, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel may constitute 
an important breach in the dike, and signal a shift in direction by the 
Court. In particular, the "ascendancy of dominion interests in land" 
which McUsic discerns in recent Takings Clause decisions,220 may be 
at an end. 
The Eastern Enterprises case does, in any event, evidence Justice 
Kennedy's increasingly independent frame of mind, as well as his some-
what idiosyncratic brand of judicial conservatism. His opinion for the 
majority in Bragdon v. Abbott further signals Justice Kennedy's inclina-
tion and ability to chart his own course, and in that case, he succeeded 
in carrying a majority of the Court with him. 
VI. "Disability" and "Direct Threat" under the ADA: 
Bragdon v. Abbott 
The non-employment law case this term likely to have the greatest 
effect on employment law is certainly Bragdon v. Abbott,221 a case that 
arose under the ADA provision addressing disability-related discrimi-
nation in the provision of public accommodations.222 This Title III deci-
sion interprets the meaning of "impairment," "major life activities," 
and "substantially limits," which together control the meaning of the 
statutory term "disability."223 In addition, the opinion discusses appro-
priate methods of proving or rebutting a claim that the individual with 
a disability poses a "direct threat" to the health or safety of others.224 
These are all terms with identical or similar formulations under Title 
218. Seeid. at595-606(1998);MollyS. McUsic, TheGhosto{Lochner: Modern Takings 
Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 608-09 (1996). 
219. See McUsic, supra note 217, at 601, 607, 633-45; McUsic, supra note 218, at 
608-10. 
220. See McUsic, supra note 217, at 598. Prof. McUsic explains that the current Court 
has "assembled nearly an equally potent arsenal of doctrinal tools" compared to the 
Lochner-era Court's instruments for analyzing substantive due process; "[i]t has adopted 
for the Takings Clause similar nexus requirements as the Lochner-era Court while incor-
porating a form of their expansive property definition. It is this combination that makes 
the Takings Clause a formidable tool against liberal economic policy." Id. at 624. 
221. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
222. 42 u.s.c. § 12182. 
223. 118 S. Ct. at 2204. 
224. Id. at 2216. 
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I of the ADA. The Supreme Court's approach in Bragdon therefore 
will provide important precedent for the lower courts in deciding ADA 
employment cases. Bragdon also provides the lower courts with a sche-
matic for the order in which they should analyze contested allegations 
that the plaintiff meets the statutory definition of "disability." 
By loosening up on important aspects of the "disability" defini-
tion, Bragdon will greatly simplify plaintiffs' overall task in typical 
ADA employment cases. Until now, plaintiffs have often found them-
selves caught between the need to show that they are severely enough 
impaired and their life activities sufficiently limited to qualify as 
"disabled," while still remaining sufficiently non-impaired to be able 
to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, the essential 
functions of the job at issue in the litigation. 225 Defendants have suc-
cessfully whipsawed plaintiffs in many cases, as the employees have 
struggled to avoid being impaled on either horn of the dilemma. By 
easing up on the requirements to prove disability, and especially 
by permitting plaintiffs to rely on major life activities unrelated to 
employment or economic gain, the Bragdon decision has made it much 
easier for certain categories of disability discrimination plaintiffs to 
establish claims. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
Plaintiff Sidney Abbott went to defendant Randon Bragdon's dental 
offices for an examination. The patient disclosed her lllV-infected sta-
tus, although she was then asymptomatic. When the dental examina-
tion revealed a cavity, Dr. Bragdon refused to fill it in his office. He 
did offer to treat the condition at a hospital at no additional charge for 
his professional services, but with the patient bearing the extra costs 
for use of the hospital's facilities.226 The district court granted summary 
judgment for plaintiffs, 227 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that asymptomatic lllV-infected status was sufficient 
to satisfy the ADA definition of "disability."22s The lower courts also 
rejected the dentist's defense that treating Abbott in Dr. Bragdon's 
office would have "posed a direct threat to the health and safety of 
others," a statutory defense under Title m of the ADA.229 
225. See, eg., Halperin v. Abacus Technology Corp., 128 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(employee who suffered back injury either was only temporarily impaired, hence not 
sufficiently limited in major life activity to be "disabled," or not available and able to 
work, hence not "qualified"); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox, 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(former employee's evidence tending to show ability to perform many types of work, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, held to preclude possibility of finding substantial 
limitation in major life activity of work, hence employee held not to be "disabled."). 
226. 118 S. Ct. at 2201. 
227. 912 F. Supp. 580,585-87 (D.Me.1995). The United States and the Maine Human 
Rights Commission had intervened as enforcement agency plaintiffs. Id. at 584. 
228. 107 F.3d 934, 939-43 (1st Cir. 1997). 
229. 912 F. Supp. at 587-91, aff'd, 107 F.3d at 943-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)). 
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The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, upheld the courts below in 
concluding that HIV infection constitutes a "disability" as defined under 
the ADA.230 The statutory definition of "disability" is contained in the 
"general provisions" of the statute, applicable identically to Title I, pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment.231 The construction adopted by 
the Court in Bragdon is therefore binding in ADA employment cases, as 
well as in public accommodations cases and other types of disability-
based discrimination cases. In particular, the Court held plaintiff's HIV 
infection satisfied the first prong of the disability definition, i.e., that it 
constituted "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one of more of the major life activities of'232 the individual claiming to 
have a disability. 233 It was therefore deemed unnecessary to consider the 
second prong, "a record of such an impairment,"234 or the third prong, 
"being regarded as having such an impairment."235 
The methodology employed by Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Court, in analyzing the definitional question, will undoubtedly become 
hornbook law, routinely recited in ADA employment discrimination 
cases as well as other types of ADA claims. While not dissimilar to 
that developed in the ADA regulations and in Circuit Court decisions, 
Justice Kennedy's formulation will crystallize the formula: 
Our consideration of subsection (A) of the definition proceeds in three 
steps. First, we consider whether respondent's HIV infection was a 
physical impairment. Second, we identify the life activity upon which 
respondent relies (reproduction and child bearing) and determine 
whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. Third, tying 
the two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment 
substantially limited the major life activity.236 
1. Impairment 
Turning to physical impairment, the Court held that "HIV infection 
satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impair-
ment during every stage of the disease."237 This result will control the 
question of impairment in future disability discrimination cases involv-
ing the AIDS virus. The Court's reasoning, moreover, takes a broad 
construction of the term "impairment" which may smooth the path for 
plaintiffs claiming many other types of disabilities. 
The current Department of Justice regulations applicable to Brag-
don as a Title Ill ADA action are virtually identical in their first two 
paragraphs to the EEOC's ADA Title I employment discrimination reg-
230. 118 S. Ct. at 2207. 
231. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2). 
232. Id. § 12102(2XA). 
233. 118 S. Ct. at 2201, 2207. 
234. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2)(B). 
235. Id. § 12102(2XC). See 118 S. Ct. at 2201. 
236. 118 S. Ct. at 2202. 
237. ld. at 2204. 
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ulations defining "physical or mental impairment. " 238 Both were drawn 
verbatim, save for minor punctuation changes, from the 1977 Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) regulations, issued to 
implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.239 The original regulations 
included a commentary containing a representative but not exhaustive 
list of disorders qualifying as physical impairments under the stat-
utes.240 In 1980, when enforcement authority for Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act was transferred to the Department of Justice, the 
agency reissued the same regulations, this time incorporating the illus-
trative listing into the text of the definitional regulation. 241 The fact 
that HIV was not identified as the cause of AIDS until after the DOJ's 
regulations were issued perhaps facilitated the Court's recognition that 
the absence ofHIV from the enumerated illnesses was of no significance, 
since the listing was merely illustrative, and "HIV infection does fall 
well within the general definition set forth by the regulations .. .''242 
At least by implication, the Court construed "impairment" as en-
compassing all disorders that fit within the broad regulatory definition, 
whether or not the condition is listed and without any need to compare 
the disorder to those on the list. 243 In holding that even asymptomatic 
HIV infection falls squarely within the physical impairment definition 
in the regulation, the Court applied a literal reading of the provision, 
which defines "impairment" as including "any physiological disorder 
or condition ... affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
... hemic and lymphatic .... "244 Because HIV causes abnormalities in 
the blood and lymph systems from the onset of infection, as well as 
because of the severity of the effects, the Court concluded that "HIV 
infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant 
and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic and lymphatic 
systems from the moment of infection," hence it satisfies the definition 
in the statute and regulations of a "physical impairment" throughout 
the course of the disease.245 
This portion of Bragdon would appear to put to rest restrictive inter-
pretations of "impairment" either relying on the detailed listing rather 
than the general rule, or restrictively interpreting which body systems' 
impairment satisfies the definition, heightening the extent of the effect 
necessary to qualify as "impairment." The Court's acceptance of cellu-
238. Compare Department of Justice ADA Title ill Public Accommodation Regula-
tions, 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(aX1) with EEOC ADA Title I Employment Regulations, 29 CFR 
§ 1630.2(h) (1997). 
239. Now codified as reissued, without amendment, by the Department of Health 
and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i). See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2202. 
240. 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977), codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, p. 334 (1997), 
discussed in Bradgon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202. 
241. See 118 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1)). 
242. ld. at 2202-03. 
243. See id. 
244. ld. at 2202 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i). 
245. ld. at 2204. 
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lar and biochemical changes as sufficient, despite the lack of symptom-
atic consequences, will strongly militate in favor of finding impairment 
in other types of cases in which the patient suffers from a disorder that 
plainly "affects" a bodily system, and in fact causes physical symptoms 
albeit not as severe as those some courts have until now deemed neces-
sary. Even more important, however, than the Court's interpretation 
of"impairment" is the majority's broad construction of"major life activ-
ity," as well as its interpretation of what relation between impairment 
and major life activity constitutes the requisite "substantial limitation" 
of the individual's activity sufficient to qualify as disabled. 
2. Major Life Activity 
The Court accepted the case at bar as having been litigated and 
presented for certiorari as though the only major life activity limited 
by the impairment was reproduction. Accordingly, the Court analyzed 
the issue as though reproduction were the only potential major life 
activity altered by the disease, while acknowledging that for many HIV 
infected persons, many other life activities are deeply affected.246 
Rejecting the defendant's argument that major life activities include 
only "aspects of a person's life which have a public, economic, or daily 
character," and carefully construing the regulatory definition listing 
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working," as 
"illustrative, not exhaustive," the Court found no basis in the text of 
either statute or regulations to infer such a limitation.247 Because the 
listing of functions such as "caring for oneself, ... and performing man-
ual tasks" in fact cuts against any requirement of economic or public 
character, the Court held that reproduction is a major life activity for 
purposes of the ADA. 248 Moreover, the court's "plain meaning" analysis 
adopts that of the First Circuit below, holding that "the plain meaning 
of the word 'major' denotes comparative importance ... .''249 
Reasoning that "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics sur-
rounding it are central to the life process itself," the Court concluded that 
"[r ]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.' "250 Un-
der this rubric, lower court decisions narrowly limiting major life activi-
ties to those with economic purpose plainly are no longer viable. 251 
3. Substantially limits 
The third element of the Court's disability analysis, the "substan-
tially limits" requirement, is likewise certain to have repercussions 
246. 118 S. Ct. at 2204·05. 
247. I d. at 2205 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84(BXiX2Xii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(bX2) (1997)). 
248. 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
249. ld. 
250. Id. 
251. For an example of such a case, see Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 
674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996), cited in Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
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going well beyond the HIV area. Noting that the regulations provide 
little guidance on the nature and degree of impact of the impairment 
on the major life activity, the Court nonetheless pointed to two "indepen-
dent ways" in which it found plaintiff had established that her impair-
ment "substantially limited" her major life activity ofreproduction.252 
First, the Court noted, the substantial risk of transmission of the fatal 
disease to one's unprotected sexual partner, "substantially limits an 
HIV-infected individual's major life activity of sexual intercourse with 
a view to reproduction. 253 Second, the significant risk an infected mother 
bears of transmitting the infection to her offspring during pregnancy 
and childbirth likewise was held to constitute a substantial limitation 
on reproduction. 254 
The Court noted, but left for another day, the very important ques-
tion of the validity of the regulations that require "the substantiality of 
the limitation to be assessed without regard to mitigating measures. "255 
According to the Court, even after anti-retroviral therapy, the risk of 
perinatal transmission is about 8 percent. Justice Kennedy dryly con-
cluded for the majority, "It cannot be said as a matter of law that an 
8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does 
not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction."256 
Relying heavily on notions of probability of harm and magnitude 
ofloss, the majority reasoned that the ADA covers "substantial limi-
tations" not merely "utter inabilities" to engage in major life activi-
ties. 257 This reasoning implicitly rejects the distinction between a 
partial defect or limitation present in 100 percent of the individual's 
activity, and the risk of up to 100 percent defect in a small but substan-
tial percentage of the individual's attempts to perform the activity. 
Both are equated as constituting a substantial limitation. The Court 
concluded that "when significant limitations result from the impair-
ment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmount-
able."258 The fact that the substantial limitation may result from the 
"choice" of the impaired individual to forego the activity in light of 
the probability of harm and the magnitude of the risk, here, of an 
HIV-infected child, does not prevent the limitation of the major life 
activity from qualifying as one causally flowing sufficiently directly 
from the impairment to satisfy the ADA definition of"disability."259 
252. 118 S. Ct. at 2206. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. ld. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. ld. at 2206-07. 
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The Court's reasoning relies both on the risks of transmission and 
on the economic and legal consequences of a decision to reproduce 
while HIV-infected as producing substantial limitations on the in-
fected individual's major life activity of reproduction.260 
4. HIV asPerSe Disability-An Open Question 
The Court reached its holding in the case at bar without addressing 
another issue presented in the petition for certiorari, "whether HIV 
infection is a per se disability under the ADA. "261 However, the majority 
bolstered its reasoning by reciting the consistent course of Rehabilita-
tion Act and ADA agency interpretation, which had uniformly found 
statutory coverage for asymptomatic individuals infected with HIV.262 
The Bragdon majority also looked to the courts' uniformly similar 
stance in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act prior to enactment of the 
ADA. 263 Congress' adoption of the same definition in amending the Fair 
Housing Act,264 and parallel Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) regulations adopted pursuant to that statute, were 
viewed as further confirmation of the correctness of this interpreta-
tion.265 In light of the uniformity of pre-ADA legislative, regulatory, and 
judicial interpretation of the definition of disability, the Court construed 
the ADA definition as constituting congressional incorporation of the 
uniform prior construction.266 In addition, the Court pointed to imple-
menting regulations and administrative guidance issued under each 
title of the ADA by the pertinent agency or agencies, including the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretation 
issued under Title I governing employment, in support of its holding 
that even in its asymptomatic phase, HIV infection "is an impairment 
which substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction."267 
While the Court declined to hold HIV -infection to be a "per se disability" 
under the Act, it is difficult to discern how a defendant in a future case 
involving an HIV-infected plaintiff could argue to the contrary.268 
260. ld. 
261. ld. at 2207. 
262. ld. at 2207-08 (citing inter alia, Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act to HIV -infected Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel264-65 (Sept. 27, 1988) (prelimi-
nary print); 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103 (1997); 7 C.F.R. § 15e.103 (1998); 22 C.F.R. § 1701.103 
(1997); 24 C.F.R. § 9.103 (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 1200.103 (1997); 45 C.F.R. §§ 2301.103, 
2490.103 (1997)). 
263. ld. at 2208. 
264. 42 u.s.c. § 3602(hX1). 
265. 118 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602<hX1), 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3245 (1989), 
codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1997)). 
266. ld. 
267. ld. at 2208-09. 
268. ld. at 2209. Were the Court in another case to reach the issue it avoided in 
Bragdon and overturn the regulations which hold that the substantiality of the limitation 
is to be evaluated without regard to mitigating measures, a defendant could conceivably 
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5. Direct Threat 
Finally, the Court addressed the asserted defense that the defendant 
had the right not to treat the plaintiff because her condition "posed a 
direct threat to the health or safety of others," meaning "a significant 
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a 
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of 
auxiliary aids or services."269 As the Court recognized, this Title III 
public accommodations defense is similar to the Title I employment 
discrimination defense that an alleged "application of qualification 
standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny 
a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be 
job-related and consistent with business necessity," where "[t]he term 
'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual 
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals 
in the workplace."270 Title I, in turn, defines "direct threat" in parallel 
with Title III. The term means "a significant risk to the health or safety 
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation."271 
The ADA, the amended Rehabilitation Act,272 and the amended Fair 
Housing Act, 273 all contain language incorporating a similar concept, 
stemming from the Court's 1987 Rehabilitation Act decision in School 
Board of Nassau County v. Arline.214 
The Bragdon Court explained that "[b]ecause few if any activities 
in life are risk free," the direct threat inquiry does "not ask whether 
a risk exists, but whether it is significant .• ms The degree of risk "must 
be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treat-
ment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on 
medical or other objective evidence."276 The test is one of objective rea-
sonableness "in light of the available medical evidence of the actions 
of the party refusing services on the basis of an alleged direct threat. ''277 
No special deference is due to the health care provider's professional 
judgment,278 hence none would be due either to an employer's or the 
argue that medical advances had rendered the impairment caused by HIV-infection one 
that did not "substantially impair" a major life activity. Even this, however, is hard to 
imagine, absent a cure for AIDS or at least a vaccine that effectively prevents the spread 
of the disease through sexual intercourse or pregnancy. Perhaps a sexually and reproduc-
tively inactive person could be found, under such circumstances, not to be disabled. 
269. I d. at 2210 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(bX3)). 
270. 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(b) (1997)). 
271. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(3) (1997). 
272. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8XD) (1997). 
273. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(0(9) (1997). 
274. 480 u.s. 273, 286-87 (1987). 
275. 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288). 
276. Id. at 2210-12 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 287). 
277. Id. at 2210. 
278. Id. 
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employer's experts' medical judgment in a Title I employment discrimi-
nation case. 
The Court nevertheless reversed the summary judgment for plain-
tiff on this point.279 The Court upheld the Court of Appeals' careful 
disavowal of the district court's reliance on material in a Center for 
Disease Control affidavit that may not have been published at the time 
the dentist refused to fill his patient's cavity outside of a hospital.280 
In the absence of any scientific evidence that treating the patient in a 
hospital would have been an effective preventative measure against the 
risk of HIV transmission, the Court further held, the Court of Appeals 
correctly disregarded the dentist's offer to fill his HIV -infected patient's 
cavity in a hospital.281 Nevertheless, the Court reversed the summary 
judgment for plaintiff on the direct threat question, regarding the two 
main pieces of evidence relied on by the Court of Appeals as insuffi-
ciently unambiguous in assessing the level of risk entailed in office 
treatment ofHIV -infected patients, rather than either identifying suffi-
cient feasible practices' or ethical and professional obligations to treat 
such patients. 282 Because the limited grant of certiorari had restrained 
the parties from canvassing the record as a whole on this issue, the 
Court, despite recognizing that other evidence in the record might be 
sufficient to sustain the summary judgment for plaintiff, vacated and 
remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals on the direct threat issue, 
while affirming the summary judgment for plaintiff on the coverage of 
her HIV-infected status as a "disability" under the ADA.283 
Justices Stevens and Breyer would have affirmed the decision below 
in toto, including on the "direct threat" issue, but voted with Justice Ken-
nedy to produce a judgment commanding majority support.284 Justice 
Ginsburg, in a brief concurring opinion, noted her agreement with both of 
the majority holdings. She affirmed on plaintiff's disability status while 
"erring ... on the side of caution" and remanding the "direct threat" 
question.285 She reasoned that "[n)orationallegislator ... would require 
nondiscrimination once symptoms become visible but permit discrimina-
tion when the disease, though present, is not yet visible ... .''286 She also 
highlighted the pervasive effectofHIV infection on "life'schoices: educa-
tion, employment, family and financial undertakings. " 287 Justice Gins-
279. /d. at 2213. 
280. Id. at 2211. 
281. /d. 
282. /d. at 2211-12. 
283. /d. at 2212-13. 
284. Id. at 2213 (Stevens and Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
285. Id. at 2214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
286. Id. at 2213-14. 
287. /d. at 2213. 
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burg appears implicitly to be urging per se recognition of HIV infection 
as a covered disability.288 
B. Rejected Alternative Interpretations of "Major Life Activities," 
"Substantially Limits," and "Direct Threat" 
Close examination of the reasoning of the dissent in this case is 
especially useful in fully appreciating more subtle aspects of the hold-
ings of the majority, as well as on its own terms. 
1. "Major Life Activities" 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dis-
sented from the Court's ruling that held that the plaintiff was a covered 
individual with a disability under the ADA; Justice O'Connor, writing 
separately, did likewise. The Chief Justice assumed arguendo that HIV 
infection qualified as an "impairment. " 289 His dissenting opinion then 
read the phrase "physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its one or more of the major life activities of such individual" as requir-
ing an individualized inquiry not only as to the nature and extent of 
the limitation, but also as to the extent to which the curtailed activity, 
but for the impairment, would have been a major activity in the daily 
life of the plaintiff.290 
This analysis was predicated on a narrower view of the meaning 
of "major life activity." Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent rejected the 
majority's understanding of"major" as indicating "comparative impor-
tance." His opinion favored, instead, the alternative dictionary defini-
tion of "greater in quantity, number, or extent." It emphasized that 
the second definition is more similar in type to the items listed as major 
life activities: "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."291 Ac-
knowledging that the list was explicitly designed to be merely illustra-
tive, the dissent nevertheless looked to the listed functions for a "com-
mon thread" running through the identified exemplars of major life 
activities, extracted the idea that these activities "are repetitively per-
formed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally function-
ing individual" and hence "quite different from the series of activities 
leading to the birth of a child."292 Justice O'Connor, separately dis-
senting in part, adopted a similar understanding of "major life activi-
288. See id. at 2213·14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
289. I d. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
290. I d. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). Justice O'Connor summarily "agree[ d) ... that [the] claim of disability should 
be evaluated on an individualized basis .... " Id. at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
291. I d. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 702 (10th ed. 1994)). 
292. I d. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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ties," to hold that the "act of giving birth to a child" does not constitute 
a "major life activity" under the ADA. In her view, no further inquiry 
about "impairment" and "substantially limits" was required.293 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, deemed it necessary to express 
his disagreement with the majority holding going beyond his view that 
reproduction and childbirth are not a statutorily covered "major life 
activity." He reasoned that there was "not a shred of record evidence 
indicating that, prior to becoming infected with HIV, respondent's major 
life activities included reproduction ... .''294 The most the record would 
support, the Chief Justice asserted, was that the plaintiff had now, 
"whatever her previous inclination, conclusively decided that she would 
not have children."295 
While the dissenting Justices avoided saying so explicitly, they 
would apparently require an ADA plaintiff, seeking to establish "major 
life activity," to prove the counterfactual assumption-that absent the 
disability, the limited activity would in fact have been a major life 
activity for the plaintiff. Thus, in the case at bar, they would have 
required plaintiff to prove that had she not suffered the impairment, 
she would have engaged in reproductive activity to a sufficient extent 
to warrant labeling it a "major life activity" for her individually. In 
light of the dissent's notion that only activities "repetitively performed 
and essential in the day to day activities of a normally functioning 
individual" constitute "major life activities,"296 it is unclear whether 
even a woman attempting to produce a very large family and nearly 
continuously pregnant or seeking to become so would qualify if she 
suddenly became medically infertile. Whether Justice Rehnquist's 
"normally functioning individual" could include one whose childrear-
ing activities are both "repetitively performed" and "essential in [his 
or her] day to day activities"297 is also far from certain. 
While such a narrow view of the scope of statutory coverage has 
been embraced by a number of lower courts, it is difficult to square 
such a view with a statute that identically covers persons disabled from 
birth, from prior to commencement of gainful employment, or only after 
completion of a portion of the worker's wage earning career. Even as 
to a given individual, daily life activities usually vary over time. The 
dissent's "individualized inquiry" does not seem to take this truism 
into account. A woman's discovery that she is infertile when she is 
sixteen may simply mean to her that she need not be concerned about 
293. Id. at 2217·18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
294. I d. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
295. Id. at 2215. 
296. Id. 
297. See id. 
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contraception if she chooses to engage in heterosexual intercourse. Her 
interest in bearing children may be quite different a decade or two later. 
Childrearing is for many people an absorbing activity, but only for about 
two decades out of a possible four or more decade long working career. 
Many other activities are more pervasive, as well as more important, 
in individuals' daily lives at different points in the life cycle. Some 
people engage in far more learning when they are younger, far more 
working in their middle years, and less of both in retirement. Both 
learning and working, nevertheless, are activities whose listing in the 
regulation supports the interpretation that they must be treated as 
"major" without regard to how often or how much time a particular 
individual actually spends engaged in their performance. 
For somebody who has never been able to perform a particular func-
tion, it is especially difficult to determine whether-always, never, or 
during a particular phase in the person's life-had she or he not been 
disabled, the activity would have been engaged in routinely. For exam-
ple, suppose an employee grows up illiterate because of inadequate ac-
cess to education, and then when attempting as an adult to learn to 
read, discovers that she or he suffers from a reading impairment such 
as dyslexia. Under the dissent's analysis, the impairment would not 
affect a major life activity of the employee, since she or he has yet to 
learn how to do it, and has not until that point spent much time engaged 
in the activity. 
The dissenters' construction would require those who have never 
been able to perform a given life activity to show it is a major one in 
their lives, on an individualized basis.298 This seems plainly at odds 
with the statutory coverage of congenitally as well as subsequently 
disabled persons. Moreover, by limiting the term to essential, repeti-
tively performed daily activities of a normally functioning individual,299 
the dissenters' interpretation would seem to exclude activities irregu-
larly performed, intermittently daily performed, or performed daily 
only in certain stages of adulthood. Finally, the dissent's definition 
seems internally contradictory, or at least doubly restrictive, without 
any basis to believe Congress so intended to multiply or curtail the 
reach of the anti-discrimination protection. On the one hand, the indi-
vidualized inquiry requirement demands that the person prove the im-
paired or wholly precluded activity was or would have been essential 
in her or his own life. On this interpretation, activities important in 
most people's lives are irrelevant if they are not crucial in the life of 
the person claiming disability status. On the other hand, the "essential 
in the day to day activities of a normally functioning individual" test300 
would preclude activities from qualifying, even if dominant in the life 
298. See 118 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
299. See id at 2215. 
300. See id 
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of the putatively disabled individual, if a "normally functioning individ-
ual" could operate without needing to perform the activity repetitively 
and from day to day. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined in by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, took an extremely narrow view of what constitutes a major 
life activity, while Justice O'Connor reserved judgment on the issue 
except to treat childbirth as falling outside of the scope of the term. All 
four justices declining to join the majority, however, suggested that the 
major life activity must be "major" in the plaintiff's own life, assessed 
individually. 
A solid, five member majority of the Court, led by Justice Kennedy, 
squarely rejected the dissent's narrow construction. Instead, the Court 
explicitly embraced the broader "comparative importance" interpreta-
tion of the provision, with a looser link to the plaintiff's own actual 
individual activities. 301 From a broad ADA policy perspective, the differ-
ence in construction is extremely important. Many impairments affect 
life activities that may qualify as "comparatively important," even if 
some or many people, at a given point in their lifetimes, do not perform 
them "repetitively" or daily. 
From a feminist point of view, the difference in analysis is especially 
significant. Pregnancy, when it occurs, changes a woman's physical 
situation for nine months at a time, and childbirth and early childrear-
ing entail further drastic changes in how parents organize their lives 
and spend their time. Most feminists, male or female, would therefore 
describe reproduction as a major life activity. This is true, despite the 
fact that nobody engages in these activities daily throughout the course 
of their lifetime. Indeed, one salient difference between the biology of 
adult women and men is that women undergo physically-related, func-
tional changes, including reproductive capacity and hormonal changes, 
to a greater degree than men during the course of their working lives. 
Moreover, in social practice, far more women than men take years out 
of their paid working careers that they devote to unpaid childrearing 
activity. Women's paid labor force participation has historically been 
far more likely than men's to be intermittent. 
A definition of "major life activity" that limits it to daily functions 
prevalent throughout the worker's adult life or working career is one 
that by definition assumes a male rather than female worker as the 
norm. Since individual reproductive choices are so closely linked to 
social and national reproduction, the very notion that childbirth and 
childrearing is not a major life activity also seems peculiarly American; 
it is hard to imagine any of the other western industrialized countries 
taking such a position seriously. In enacting the Family and Medical 
Leave Act,302 Congress appears to have recognized that childbirth, 
301. Id. at 2205. 
302. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2654. 
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childcare, and care of ailing elders and close family members are a 
major life activity, at one point or another, during the working careers 
of a great many Americans. 
One could hail the analysis in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion 
as the beginnings of judicial reconceptualization, defining the American 
citizen with a dual gender norm, one that recognizes that in this genera-
tion of workers' lives, men and women alike are both workers and par-
ents. Justice O'Connor, in her categorical exclusion of reproduction from 
the major life activity category, even more than Chief Justice 
;Rehnquist, in his individualized analysis of how much daily time or 
repetitive activity is involved in the process, implicitly adheres to the 
contrary tradition. Justice O'Connor's reasoning, and certainly the em-
ployer's proposed interpretation covering only "aspects of a person's life 
which have a public, economic, or daily character,"303 could be viewed as 
reflecting the old, one dimensional view of the citizen and worker, the 
stereotyped male breadwinner, and the public-private conceptual divide 
between individuals' public, economic, and commercial lives, on the one 
hand, and their household private lives that remain their own, on the 
other. Private family activities, on this view, are insufficiently socially 
important to warrant ADA protection if an impairment limits the indi-
vidual's ability to continue to perform the function. The traditionally 
female sphere, it is implicitly presumed, was not of concern to Congress 
in enacting workplace-related legislation. Of course, one could turn this 
around and suggest that it is Justice O'Connor who is the true feminist, 
since she refuses to treat childrearing as a central, defining characteris-
tic of womanhood. 
2. "Substantially Limits" 
The third argument of the dissent is that, assuming arguendo, repro-
duction were a major life activity of the plaintiff, asymptomatic HIV 
infection does not "substantially limit" the activity.304 Those infected 
remain, at least for a time, physically able to engage in the activity, 
including sexual relations, childbirth, and childrearing. The dissenters 
would conf"me the "substantially limits" term to physical-or in the case 
of mental or emotional disabilities, presumably mental or emotional-
limitations on the ability to engage in the identified major life activity, 
which limitations must be directly caused by the impairment.305 
In effect, the dissent writes a narrowly defined causation require-
ment into the statutory text. When the limitation is a "voluntary" 
reaction or a "choice" of the victim of the impairment to avoid engaging 
in the activity, the gap in the physical causation chain would, in the view 
303. See 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
304. I d. at 2215·16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part) (emphasis added). 
305. ld. at 2216. 
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of these members of the Court, preclude a finding that the impairment 
"substantially limits" the activity.306 On this analysis, whenever the 
impairment itself does not directly limit the ability to perform the activ-
ity, but instead greatly multiplies the odds that it will not merely be 
unsuccessful but will also cause severely harmful consequences, the 
individual whose "choices" are severely constrained by the impairment 
is not disabled.307 Nor apparently, may the victim of an impairment 
take the future effects of her own disease on herself into account in 
deciding whether she is rendered incapable of raising the child to adult-
hood: according to the literal reading of the dissent, a disability may 
be established only to the extent that an "impairment substantially 
limits (present tense) a major life activity."308 
Here, too, the majority squarely rejects the statutory construction 
espoused by the dissent. The majority reasons that Abbott's HIV infec-
tion "substantially limited her ability to reproduce in two independent 
ways": first, because of the risk of infection of her partner which would 
be entailed by the unprotected sexual intercourse necessary to conceive; 
and second, because of the risk of perinatal transmission of the infection 
to any child she might conceive during pregnancy or delivery.309 The 
majority concludes: "Conception and childbirth are not impossible for 
an HIV victim, but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health. 
This meets the definition of a substantiallimitation."310 Economic and 
legal consequences, including health care costs for HIV -infected mother 
and child and state law prohibitions against sexual intercourse by in-
fected individuals, are also cited as bases supporting the substantial 
limitation finding.311 In summary, normal human responses by the in-
fected individual to consequences of the impairment count as suffi-
ciently directly and causally linked to the impairment if they entail 
substantial limitation of a major life activity. When the infected person 
substantially limits her or his major life activities to avoid significant 
risks, caused by the impairment, of extremely adverse health conse-
quences to third parties, or economic or legal consequences to him or 
herself, this satisfies the statutory definition of disability. 
Interestingly, while the dissent speaks of the need to individually ex-
amine the plaintiff's activities and the effect on them of the impairment, 
the dissent's overall approach would generically and categorically ex-
clude as many impairments from the protective ambit of disability dis-
crimination laws as the majority's approach will categorically include. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. I d. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(emphasis added). 
309. Id. at 2206. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
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3. Direct Threat 
The final portion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, 
joined in by Justice O'Connor, addresses the "direct threat" issue.312 
The dissenters would give no extra weight to the views of public health 
authorities in assessing the scientific reasonableness of the dentist's 
actions.313 As a result, while the majority remands leaving open the 
possibility that reexamination of the record by the Court of Appeals 
will lead to its affirmance of the summary judgment for plaintiff on the 
direct threat issue, 314 the dissent regards the evidence as sufficiently 
disputed to preclude summary judgment for plaintiff.315 
C. Future Implications 
In an ADA employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove 
that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" who suffered dis-
crimination on the basis of disability as to a term or condition of employ-
ment. 316 Some ADA cases raise simple claims of disparate treatment, 
that is, adverse, differential treatment of the disabled individual com-
pared to the treatment of able-bodied workers.317 A few raise claims of 
disparate impact, challenging facially neutral employment practices 
that disproportionately and disadvantageously affect persons with disa-
bilities or with a particular disability, compared to the able-bodied.318 
Most employment-related disability discrimination cases, however, in-
312. ld. at 2216-18. 
313. I d. at 2216-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part) (emphasis added). 
314. ld. at 2213. 
315. I d. at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
316. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8), 12112. See, e.g., Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, 
Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). 
317. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(bX1). See, e.g., Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook 
County, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997) (mentally impaired employee fired for violent 
threats was held to have been fired because of conduct, not mental disability, even if 
employee's conduct stemmed from disability, hence no disability-based disparate treat-
ment occurred); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc. 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (employee 
discharged because employer perceived plaintiff's heart attack as disabling condition); 
McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1992) (Rehabilitation Act) (disparate 
treatment in application of leave of absence policy against employee whose disability 
was inability to bear children); Carter v. Casa Central, 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(Rehabiliation Act) (failure to reinstate employee to job after disability-related leave of 
absence found unlawful because motivated by employee's disability); Price v. S-B Tool, 
75 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 1996) (epileptic employee terminated for violating employer's 3 per 
cent no-fault absenteeism ceiling when she failed to resort to employer's generous leave 
of absence policy, held not terminated because of her disability but because of her absen-
teeism). 
318. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(bX1), 12112(bX3), 12112(bX6), 12112(bX7). For 
example, see Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998) (challeng-
ing employer's one year ceiling on medical leaves of absence on theory it had a disparate 
impact on individuals with disabilities). See also Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison 
Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing potential ADA disparate impact 
theory, but noting that plaintiff had waived it). 
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volve disputes over the employer's duty to provide the worker with 
"reasonable accommodation," so long as it can be done "without undue 
hardship" to the employer.319 
A "qualified individual with a disability" is a worker who suffers 
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the worker's major life activities and who can, with or without reason-
able accommodation, perform the essential functions of the job the 
worker holds or seeks to hold.320 
The courts have until now usually proceeded by requiring plaintiff 
to: (1) prove she suffers from an "impairment"; (2) point to one or more 
activities which the worker contends are her affected "major life activi-
ties"; (3) demonstrate that the activity is "substantially limited" be-
cause of the impairment; and (4) show that she is capable of performing 
the essential functions of the job at issue, identifying suitable reason-
able accommodations if necessary.321 
Narrow lower court interpretations of one or more of the first three 
elements have constrained many plaintiffs to identify "work" as their 
substantially limited major life activity. For many plaintiffs, relying 
on "work" is an error fatal to their lawsuit. Unlike other major life 
activities, as to which partial but significant impairment is sufficient, 
when "work" is the activity, the regulations impose more demanding 
requirements on plaintiffs. Either the worker must be unable to perform 
a fairly narrow occupational category, say, surgeon, electrician, or typ-
ist, across a range of businesses and industries, or the worker must be 
unable to perform a wide range of jobs, e.g., most unskilled or semi-
skilled operative positions within a given industry.322 The intent of the 
regulations is to preclude the professional track and field runner, whose 
knees deteriorate to the point where he or she can no longer produce 
Olympic-caliber performances, from claiming that her ability to "work" 
319. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(bX5XA), 12111(9), 12111(10). See, e.g., Bor-
kowski v. Valley Central School Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 135-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases 
regarding allocation of evidentiary burdens as to reasonable accommodation without 
undue hardship); Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (employer held liable for failure to provide reasonable accommodation only 
when it bears responsibility for breakdown of interactive process of identifying suitable 
forms of accommodation for employee); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, 
Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1997)(employerfound to have offered employee five 
types of reasonable accommodation, held not required to provide further accommodation; 
employee not entitled to form of accommodation of her choice); Chiari v. City of League 
City, 920 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1991) (when constuction inspector's disability rendered 
his gait unsteady so he could no longer perform an essential element of his job, climbing 
buildings, reasonable accommodation did not encompass requiring the city to create a 
new position including only tasks he was able to perform). 
320. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8). 
321. See, e.g., Halperin v. Abacus Technology Copr., 128 F.3d 191, 198 (4th Cir. 1997). 
This formulation differs little from that adopted by the Court in Bragdon. See supra text 
accompanying note 232. 
322. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX3Xi)(1997). See, e.g., Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 
1176 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
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is "substantially limited" when she can still walk, run faster than most 
people, and perform non-athletic jobs.323 Courts often insist, however, 
that plaintiffs claiming their activity of "work" is "substantially lim-
ited" demonstrate that absent reasonable accommodation, they are in-
capable of carrying out the responsibilities in quite a broad range of 
positions.324 Even if a plaintiff can surmount this hurdle, she is likely 
to do so in a fashion that will work against her success at the next step, 
in showing that with or without reasonable accommodation, she can 
perform the essential functions of her job.325 It is little wonder than 
only a relative handful of plaintiffs survive their attempt to run this 
gauntlet. This is one, if not the only, explanation for the remarkable 
statistic of the recent ABA study finding that employers have been 
winning about ninety-two percent of fully-litigated ADA employment 
discrimination cases. 326 
Bragdon assists plaintiffs in several ways to escape from this bind. 
First, the decision adopts the broad "comparative importance" defini-
323. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App. (professional baseball pitcher). "The inability 
to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major 
life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX3Xi). The second portion of the provision 
interpreting "substantially limits" as it applies to the major life activity of work focuses 
on the range of other jobs from which the individual is excluded because of her or his 
impairment. See id. 
324. See, e.g., Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 D.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(employee's inability to perform lifting twenty pounds on a frequent basis, or forty-five 
pounds occasionally along with evidence that employee "will need ... retraining into a 
position where he does not have to stand for prolonged periods, held insufficient to support 
a finding of substantial limitation of major life activity of work or of lifting); Bolton v. 
Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939,943-44 (lOth Cir. 1994)(evidence of nature, severity, duration 
and impact of employee's impairment, plus workers' compensation finding of 9 per cent 
permanent partial disability in one foot and 29 per cent permanent partial disability in 
the other, does not suffice to show employee significantly restricted from performing 
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes); McKay v. Toyota Motor 
Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371-73 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that employee's carpal 
tunnel syndrome does "not significantly restrict her ability to perform the class of jobs 
at issue, manufacturing jobs; at [most) ... her impairment disqualifies her from only 
the narrow range of assembly line manufacturing jobs that require repetitive motion or 
frequent lifting of more than two pounds;" she is therefore not substantially limited in 
her major life activity of work). See also id. at 374 ("The majority ... holds that an 
individual who provided competent and unimpeached expert testimony that her physical 
impairment disqualifies her from performing all heavy duty jobs, all medium duty jobs, 
as well as those light and sedentary jobs requiring repetitive motion, does not, as a matter 
of law, have a substantial impairment of the major life activity of working .... I am 
unable to reconcile this conclusion with the facts or with what I view as a reasonable 
interpretation of the ADA ... ")(Hillman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
325. See, e.g., Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997) (em· 
ployee either not disabled, because could perform too many types of work, or not qualified, 
because even with accommodation, could not perform essential functions of his existing 
position, or both). 
326. See Disabilities Discrimination: Overwhelming Majority of ADA Job Suits Fail 
in Court, American Bar Association Survey Finds, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 119, 
at D7 (June 22, 1998). 
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tion of major life activity, making it easier for plaintiffs to point to other 
non-work activities, even if not listed in the regulations. Second, the 
Court relaxes both the tightness and the directness of the causal link 
the plaintiff must show between the impairment and the limitation of 
a major life activity. Cessation of the life activity to avoid serious eco-
nomic or legal harm to plaintiff, or to avoid physical risks of grave 
bodily harm whether to plaintiff or to third parties, will suffice. This 
is true, even if plaintiff is not directly, physically incapacitated from 
performing the major life activity, in whole or in part, by the impairment 
itself. Not only does this ease plaintiff's burden in showing "substantial 
limitation," indirectly it further broadens the range of non-work major 
life activities to which a plaintiff with a given impairment can success-
fully point. 
Finally, the Bragdon Court has clarified the definition of "physical 
impairment" by adopting a broad, literal interpretation of the regula-
tion327 that includes any disorder affecting at least one ofthe following 
body systems: "neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; re-
spiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, diges-
tive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine."328 
The Court accepts "impairments" at the molecular and cellular 
level that demonstrably, biochemically affect a major body system 
long before the damage manifests itself in palpable physical symp-
toms. This, too, further broadens ADA plaintiffs' possibilities of iden-
tifying impairments that physically or behaviorally limit substan-
tially a major life activity of the plaintiff's. Moreover, such 
impairments help plaintiffs avoid contributing to their own demise 
via evidence tending to prove that the worker's impairment is likely 
to interfere with her ability to perform essential functions of the job, 
even with reasonable accommodation. 
The Court's "direct threat" holding, on the other hand, will have 
only minor equivocal impact on the case law as it has heretofore devel-
oped. The Bragdon Court thoroughly rejected the dentist's medical pro-
fessional deference argument: 
As a health care professional, petitioner had the duty to assess the 
risk of infection based on the objective, scientific information available 
to him and others in his profession. His belief that a significant risk 
existed, even if maintained in good faith, would not relieve him from 
liability .... [P]etitioner receives no special deference simply because 
he is a health care professional. 329 
327. 118 S. Ct. at 2202. 
328. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3GX2Xi) (1997), quoted in Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(h), the Title I regulation, contains virtually identical wording. See supra notes 
234-238 and accompanying text. 
329. ld. at 2210. 
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Medical deference arguments, however, had not previously gained 
any broad acceptance in the lower courts. Likewise, little change was 
made in prevailing law by the majority holding,330 accepted by the dis-
senters as well,331 that the existence of a "significant risk to the health 
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by" reasonable accommoda-
tion332 "must be determined from the standpoint of the person who re-
fuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must 
be based on medical or other objective evidence."333 
In instances where the scientific evidence regarding risk of trans-
mission or contagion, or regarding the effectiveness of preventative 
measures, is uncertain or conflicting, the majority's remand on this 
point may modestly expand the scope of the potential defense. The defen-
dant's actions must be shown to be "reasonable in light of the available 
medical evidence"; the views of public health authorities on the matter 
receive special deference, but are not controlling.334 "A health care pro-
fessional [and presumably, an employer acting on the basis of advice 
of a health care professional] who disagrees with the prevailing medical 
consensus may refute it by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating 
form the accepted norm."335 All evidence must be judged based on its 
availability to the medical decision-maker at the time of the challenged 
decision. 336 The Court remanded to permit the Court of Appeals to reex-
amine whether, carefully focusing on information available at the ap-
propriate time to the defendant, enough credible, objective scientific 
evidence had been presented to support a dispute of material fact as to 
the "direct threat" defense.337 This fact-dependent analysis may never-
theless suggest a slight broadening of summary judgment standards 
in favor of those asserting the defense. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that by its own terms, the defense can only be raised in an extremely 
narrow category of cases. 
Bragdon v. Abbott is the Court's shakedown cruise under the ADA. 
Because the Court construes several key provisions, and resolves nearly 
all interpretative disputes in favor of plaintiffs, the decision will almost 
certainly be perceived in future years as a seminal disability rights 
case, governing discrimination in employment as well as public accom-
modation. 
330. See id. at 2201. 
331. Id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part); id. at 2218 (O'Connor, J., joining in this portion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion). 
332. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(bX3) (Title llD; 12111(3) (Title D. 
333. 118 S. Ct. at 2210. 
334. ld. at 2211. 
335. Id. 
336. ld. at 2211-12. 
337. Id. at 2212. 
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VII. Unexpected Observations: Private Employers as Losers, 
Public Employers as Winners, and Justice Kennedy's 
Pivotal Role in this Term's Decisions 
A. Winners and Losers 
Some peculiarities may be observed about this term's labor and 
employment law rulings. Private employers lost all cases in which they 
were defendants against individual employee338 or pension plan admin-
istrator339 plaintiffs. General Motors could not even manage to enforce 
the injunctive provisions of its prior wrongful termination lawsuit set-
tlement agreement to prevent its former employee from testifying 
against it.340 On the other hand, unions fared even worse than employ-
ers, winning no cases in which they were parties.341 When private em-
ployers litigated opposite unions or government agencies, their chances 
of success therefore improved mightily. They won both cases involving 
labor-management relations issues.342 The former coal company's chal-
lenge to government-mandated payments into the governmentally-
administered benefits trust fund was similarly successful.343 
Public employers and their officials as employment decision-makers 
fared far better than private sector employers. In the cases where rules 
applicable to all employment discrimination defendants, public or pri-
vate, were applied to a public employer, it suffered the same types of 
losses as its private sector counterparts. A public employer lost one of 
the sexual harassment Title VII cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 344 
as well as Hetzel v. Prince William County, 345 requiring a retrial option to 
satisfy Seventh Amendment concerns when an appellate court imposes 
remittitur on a plaintiff who has won a substantial jury verdict in em-
ployment discrimination (or any other type) of litigation. 
On the other hand, when public employers or their officials litigated 
defenses to liability specific to governmental actors, they were highly 
successful. Thus, in Bogan v. Scott-Harris,346 municipal government offi-
cials were able to wrap themselves in the mantle of absolute legislative 
immunity to preclude any pretext or mixed motives inquiry into the 
reasons underlying their ostensibly legislative decision to eliminate 
the employee's position from the city budget, thereby effectively termi-
nating the plaintiff's employment. 
338. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Geissal, 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998); Oncale, 118 S. 
Ct. 998 (1998); Oubre, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998). 
339. Bay Area Laundry Pension Trust Fund, 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997). 
340. Baker v. General Motors, 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998). 
341. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998); Textron, 118 S. Ct. 1626 
(1998); Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
342. Textron, 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998); Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
343. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). 
344. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
345. 118 S. Ct. 1210 (1998). 
346. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998). 
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In LaChance v. Erickson,347 the federal government persuaded the 
Court that there was no due process or statutory problem in punishing 
a government employee with discharge for the misconduct oflying dur-
ing a government investigation into an under lying allegation of miscon-
duct. The criminal case against union defendants, Brogan v. United 
States, 348 is roughly analogous to permitting government use of criminal 
sanctions to coerce those under investigation for criminal violations to 
respond truthfully or remain silent under government investigator's 
questioning, on pain of criminal punishment despite the lack offormal 
oath and inapplicability of criminal perjury law. 
One could also see evidence of a trend protective of government 
interests in the Court's Title IX ruling, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District,349 narrowly restricting circumstances under which a 
local school board or other educational institution may be held liable on 
vicarious liability grounds for sexual harassment of students by school 
employees, their teachers. Gebser imposed a requirement that the stu-
dents complain to school system authorities empowered to respond to 
such complaints as a precondition to imposing private damage liability 
on the school board. The Court further precluded liability if the authori-
ties respond to a complaint with more than "deliberate indifference" 
to the teacher's reported misconduct.350 One may profitably contrast 
Gebser with this term's Title VII sexual harassment imputed liability 
precedents, Ellerth351 and Faragher.352 It is clear that the Court took 
an approach under Title IX far more protective of public education insti-
tutional interests than would be the case in employment litigation, 
which may be brought against private as well as public employers under 
Title VII. 353 All in all, at least in matters related to the employment 
relationship, the Court has displayed considerably more solicitude for 
the perceived special needs of government employers and their officials 
as opposed to private sector employers. 
Another public employment case, Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. 
Schacht,354 runs partially counter to this trend. However, in the Su-
preme Court, the Schacht case probably was not perceived as an employ-
ment law matter. While the case arose as an employment termination 
cause of action, substantive wrongful discharge law was not before the 
Court on certiorari. Before the Supreme Court, Schacht solely concerned 
issues of general applicability to all cases involving state defendants 
347. 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998). 
348. 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998). 
349. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
350. Id. at 1993. 
351. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
352. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
353. The comparison between the Court's approach under Title IX and Title Vll is 
spelled out in greater detail in Weiss, supra note 9, at 279-87. 
354. 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998). 
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sued for federal constitutional violations in state courts. The Schacht 
Court addressed the issue of how to apply federal removal jurisdiction 
law when one of the removing defendants is a state entitled to assert 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 
Plaintiff, a prison guard, had been terminated, allegedly for 
workplace theft, and had sued in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
both the State, as his former employer, and several prison officials in 
both their official and personal capacities. The defendants removed the 
case to federal court, and there the defense of Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity was asserted on behalf of both the State and the 
officials as to claims against them in their official capacities. The district 
court dismissed those claims, and in addition granted summary judg-
ment on the remaining claims against the officials acting in their per-
sonal capacities. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had 
lacked jurisdiction over the entire action. The presence of the claims 
subject to the Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals reasoned, 
not only divested the court of authority to resolve those claims, but 
precluded the entire case from being removable. The Supreme Court, 
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer, reversed. The Court held that 
the fact that the state defendants had the right to waive the sovereign 
immunity defense indicated that at the time of removal, the entire case 
was removable as to all defendants; the district court's jurisdiction was 
not impaired until the defendants after removal asserted the sovereign 
immunity defense. Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion 
in which he pointed out that the difficult, partially circular problem of 
whether sovereign immunity is in the nature of an affirmative defense 
or an outright deprivation of federal jurisdiction could be best avoided 
by construing the defendant's participation in the removal as equivalent 
to a waiver of the defense. Again displaying that independent cast of 
mind that appears to be the hallmark of his decisions this term related 
to labor and employment law, Justice Kennedy in effect invited future 
litigants to present a sovereign immunity waiver argument in a future 
removal case. 
B. The Pivotal Role of Justice Kennedy 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Justice Kennedy domi-
nated the Court's decision-making in the labor and employment law 
field this term. Many of this term's employment-related cases pivot on 
Justice Kennedy's position. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opin-
ions in Ellerth,355 one of the two Title VII sexual harassment vicarious 
liability decisions, Bragdon,356 the major ADA case, and Oubre,357 the 
355. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
356. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
357. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998). 
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ADEA waiver case. He provided the critical fifth vote, concurring in the 
judgment but declining to support the plurality on the takings theory 
in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,358 his concurring opinion in Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections v. Schachf59 issued an important invitation 
to future litigants, and in Gebser,360 the Title IX sexual harassment 
case, he provided the fifth vote in support of the Court's position severely 
restricting school systems' vicarious liability for sexual harassment of 
students by teachers. Only in Allentown Mack361 was he in the dissent, 
and then only on the portion of Justice Scalia's decision accepting as 
rational and consistent with the Act the NLRB's good faith reasonable 
doubt standard for employer polling of employee union sentiment; he 
was with the five member majority on the later portion of the opinion 
overturning the NLRB's factual finding that the employer lacked an 
objective basis to support its good faith doubt. 
This term, Justice Kennedy voted frequently in labor and employ-
ment-related cases with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
to form a majority. In the two 7-2 cases, Ellerth362 and Faragher, 363 the 
paired sexual harassment vicarious liability cases, the Chief Justice 
and Justice O'Connor joined the other five. Justice Kennedy wrote the 
Court's opinion in Ellerth, in moderating tones, while plainly heavily 
influencing Justice Souter's somewhat less restrained majority opinion 
in Faragher. The two decisions are mutually cross-referenced and incor-
porate identical language as to the employer's affirmative burden of 
proof regarding hostile environment claims involving supervisor's ac-
tivities. Only Justices Thomas and Scalia did not find the middle ground 
defined by Justice Kennedy (and Souter) to be acceptable. 
In several cases, the vote was 5-4, with Justice Kennedy casting the 
decisive choice between two rather stable blocks consisting of Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, on the (very loosely defined) 
left, and the Chief Justice, together with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Thomas on the right. The tone of the opinions, as well as the growing 
stability of these voting blocks, suggests an increasing polarization be-
tween the two wings of the Court, with the middle ground frequently 
mediated by Justice Kennedy. 
In assessing the term's overall corpus oflabor and employment deci-
sions, Justice Scalia's role this year was also noteworthy. He wrote the 
majority opinion in two very important decisions: Allentown Mack,364 
the NLRA polling case, and Oncale,365 the Title VII same sex sexual 
358. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). 
359. 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998). 
360. Gebser v. Lago Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
361. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
362. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
363. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
364. 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998). 
365. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 595 1998-1999
1997-98 Court Term(Partll): NLRA, Takings Clause, and ADA 595 
harassment case. Justice Scalia's literal interpretivist approach to 
construing statutes was on display in the labor and employment law 
decisions he wrote for a majority of the Court, as well as in his separate 
concurring and dissenting opinions.366 Resort to the dictionary as au-
thority for interpretation of positive law is well on the way to becoming 
habitual on this Court. 
While other Justices authored two or more majority opinions in the 
labor and employment law field, these were typically technical decisions 
in which the Court was unanimous or nearly so. Without undervaluing 
the significance of key decisions written by other Justices, particularly 
Justice Souter's majority opinion in Faragher367 and Justice Breyer's 
large corpus of important concurring or dissenting opinions this term in 
Textron,368 Allentown Mack,369 Oubre,370 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,371 
and Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller,372 one would have to say that 
Justice Kennedy was the dominant figure in labor and employment 
law for this Supreme Court term. Given the division within the Court, 
it would appear likely that his role will persist in years to come. 
366. See note 197 supra and accompanying text, identifying Justice Scalia's opinions 
last term that cited the dictionary as authority. 
367. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
368. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Auto Work-
ers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1632 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
369. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 833 (1998) (Breyer, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
370. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 118 S. Ct. 838, 843 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
371. 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2161 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
372. 118 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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